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ABSTRACT

The implementation of the European Union's Action Plan for Financial
Services ("FSAP") is largely complete, though the transposition of
relevant legislation into the Member States' legal orders is still pending.
The new legislation has significantly revamped the EU's legal and
regulatory framework governing financial markets. The Lamfalussy
process has been successfully utilized in debating and enacting the most
important pieces of the new EC securities legislation. This article
provides a critical analysis of the securities Directives passed under
FSAP and critically evaluates their impact on EU capital markets and the
EU financial services industry. Furthermore, this article sheds light on
the evolution of EC financial market regulation and on the most
important and intricate points of the new legislation. It explains the
reasons that make the new legislation an agent of profound change for
EU financial markets in terms of structure, business planning and trading
processes. Finally, the article debates the cost of compliance with and
enforcement of the new framework and the supervisory and enforcement
loopholes created due to the absence of a single regulator for EU
financial markets.
I. INTRODUCTION

EC securities regulation' has been, along with the introduction of the euro,
the cornerstone of all efforts aiming at the integration of EU financial markets.
Yet, developing this body of EC law has been a very lengthy process frequently
1. In this Article the term European Union ("EU') is used to indicate the geographic, economic and
political aspects of the EU. The term European Community ("EC") is used as a strictly legal term to describe
the source of the legislation examined here which is the EC part of the first pillar of the EU.
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marred by controversy. In addition, a marked lack of direction has been its most
distinctive characteristic for almost two decades. This was caused by three
factors. The first factor was the existence of conflicting national agendas
motivated by a desire to protect and preserve domestic investment firms, national
securities markets and local business customs. The second factor was the
unwillingness of the global financial services industry to engage in a constructive
dialogue and find a common language with EC legislators. This unwillingness was
attributable to the inability of the industry to recognize the varied and important ways
through which EC securities law was able to influence the evolution of its business
processes, development of new products, and ultimately the competitiveness and
profitability of its members. The third factor was the inability of EC officials and
legislators to fully understand the intricacies of modem financial markets; in
particular, their globalized nature and the fast pace of innovation within them. This
resulted in the production of legislation that often reflected the reserve, awe, and
prejudice with which EC bodies used to view the workings of global finance.
The majority of these dysfunctions have been addressed by FSAP2 and the
introduction of the Lamfalussy process. The latter has accelerated the speed of
debating and enacting relevant laws in the EU and has widened the scope for
constructive industry consultation
EC legislation passed in the context of FSAP departs radically from the
principle of minimum harmonization and creates self-standing regulatory regimes
in a number of areas; most notably in the regulation of market abuse and of
licensed financial exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems. It also upgrades
the EC legal framework that governs the public offer of securities, and their
admission to trading on securities exchanges. The transposition of the new
legislation into the legal orders of the Member States will be followed by seismic
changes in the way investment firms and other investment professionals conduct
business in the EU. The new legislation will also have a profound impact on the
structure of the Union's financial markets and financial services industry.
Broadly, EC Directives enacted under FSAP may be distinguished into
integrative legislation (measures that promote the aim of integrated financial
markets in the EU) and protective legislation (measures that deal with the effects
of market integration). Predominantly integrative in their objectives are the
following: the Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments ("MiFID"), 4 the

2. See Commission Communication, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial
Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232.
3. See Commission Staff Working Document, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process to EU
Securities Markets Legislation, A Preliminary Assessment by the Commission Services, 15.11.2004, SEC
(2004) 1459, at 4-8 [hereinafter EC Commission, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process]. For a detailed
analysis of the mechanics of the Lamfalussy process see section U.C infra.
4. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Markets in
Financial Instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1,
(hereinafter MiFID).

2005 /A CriticalEvaluationof the New EC Financial-MarketRegulation
Public Offers and Admissions Prospectus Directive ("POPD I,"),5 and the
Directive on Takeover Bids.6 The core of protective legislation comprises the
Market Abuse Directive 7 and the Transparency Directive.! These deal with the
effects of market integration by ensuring the availability of information to
investors in the single market and a uniform prohibition of market abuse.
The article is divided in seven sections. The first is the present introduction.
Section II discusses the evolution of EC securities regulation. Section III
describes the rationales for the enactment of MiFID and its main features.
Section IV provides a critical discussion of the EC's emerging market abuse
regime mainly comprising the Market Abuse Directive and its Level 2
implementing measures. Section V discusses the new regime for the public offer
of securities and their admission to trading on a regulated market in the EU and
the periodic disclosure obligations imposed by the Transparency Directive.
Section VI attempts an evaluation of the emerging regulatory regime for primary
and secondary capital markets in the EU. Finally, the present discussion is
brought to a comprehensive conclusion in Section VII.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EC SECURITIES REGULATION
A. The ECJ's Jurisprudenceand the Single EuropeanAct
The existence of a common legal and regulatory framework is often viewed
as a sine qua non for the establishment and effective operation of integrated
markets. Nonetheless, it has not always been possible for the Community to enact
harmonization legislation. Until the mid-1980s the decisions of the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") were the most important factor in the approximation of
national laws in what was, at the time, the European Economic Community
("EEC"). However, the ECJ's jurisprudence could not have been an effective
alternative to harmonization legislation with regard to market integration. 9
5. Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the
Prospectus to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending
Directive 2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 [hereinafter the POPD lI].
6. Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover
Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142)12 [hereinafter the Takeover Bids Directive]. The enactment of this Directive came after
a legal and political struggle that lasted well over a decade.
7. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 [hereinafter the Market Abuse
Directive].
8. Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
Harmonization of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L390) 38
[hereinafter the Transparency Directive].
9. See generally E. Lomnicka, The Internal FinancialMarket and Investment Services, in EC FINANCIAL
MARKET REGULATION AND COMPANY LAW (M. Andenas & S. K. Slade eds., 1993), 82-86; N. Poser,
Automation of Securities Markets and the EC's Proposed Investment Services Directive, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs 29 (1992). For a very comprehensive and analytical discussion of the different aspects of EC securities
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One of the reasons for this was that rules based on the concept of "general
good" gradually became a very important obstacle in the achievement of the goal
of the single market in many areas, including financial services.'0 Under the
ECJ's jurisprudence, the concept of the "general good" referred to imperative
public interest requirements, which extended, inter alia, to the protection of
consumers-investors, regardless of whether the regulations restricting crossborder trade were imposed by the home or the host state." Therefore, the
attainment of the aim of market integration could not be achieved in the absence
of harmonization of Member States' laws in a variety of areas, including those
covered by "general good" legislation.
In 1985, the Delors' Commission published its "White Paper" on the internal
market. The goal was to remove all obstacles to market integration. To effectively
achieve this aim and facilitate the enactment of harmonization legislation, the
White Paper declared a shift of focus for EC statutory law. This shift moved the
focus away from detailed mandatory rules towards a more flexible framework
within which harmonization legislation would utilize the principles of "mutual
recognition" and "minimum harmonization." The White Paper's objectives with
regard to financial services were the complete liberalization of capital movements;
the integration of national markets for financial services; and the establishment of a
harmonized regulatory framework for the licensing, operation, and on-going
supervision of financial institutions. The White Paper was adopted by the Council
of Ministers and constituted the basis for the Single European Act ("SEA") 1986,
an amendment of the Treaty of Rome.
Financial services legislation produced in the context of SEA dealt with the
issue of prudential regulation of credit institutions and investment firms by
creating a common regulatory framework through the enactment of the Banking
Directives,' 3 the Investment Services Directive ("ISD"), 4 and the Capital

regulation see NIAMH MOLONEY, EC SECURITIES REGULATION 66-82 (2002) [hereinafter MOLONEY, EC
SECURITIES REGULATION].

financial services

A valuable contribution to the discussion of the EC regulatory framework for

is CONSTITUTES Y. AVGERINOS, REGULATING AND SUPERVISING INVESTMENT SERVICES IN

THE EUROPEAN UNION (2003). Very interesting contributions may also be found in CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE
AGE OF THE EURO-CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED COMPANIES AND REGULATION (G. Ferrarini et al

eds., 2002).
10. Case 15178, Societe Generale Alsacienne de Banque v. Koestler,, 1 C.M.L.R. 89 (1979).
11. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financien, 1995 E.C.R. 1-1141; Case C101/94, EC Commission v. Italy (Re Restrictions on Foreign Securities Dealers), 1996 E.C.R. 1-2691; Case C222/95, Societe Civile Immobiliere Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3899.
12. EC Commission, Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the
European Council, COM (1985)310 final at 6.
13. The term 'Banking Directives' encompasses the Second Banking Directive (89/646/EEC, 1989 O.J.
(L 386) 1), the Own Funds (89/299/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L124) 16), the Large Exposures (92/121/EEC, 1992 O.J.
(L 29) 1 and the Solvency Ratio Directives [89/647/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14] now all consolidated in
Directive 2000/12/EEC Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, 2000 O.J.
(L 126) 1.
14. Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1993
O.J. (L 141) 27.
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Adequacy Directive.'" It also provided for a harmonized regime to draw up and
publish disclosure documents in the context of the public offer of securities'6 and
the prohibition of insider dealing. 7
However, harmonization legislation under the SEA did not extend to a
number of areas, resulting in a reduction of the pace of market integration. ' In
fact, even following the implementation of the ISD, wide differences could be
observed throughout the EU in: (a) the way financial services contracts were
formed; (b) the way national conduct of business rules regulated the relationship
between financial services intermediaries and their clients; (c) the way
exemptions from the public offer rules were provided or administered in various
Member States; (d) the application of marketing and investment advertisement
rules; and (e) the way regulators understood and interpreted the harmonized
legislation.
B. The Adoption of FSAP
Having considered the aforementioned gaps in EC financial market
legislation, the Commission issued a Communication on building a framework
for action on financial services in the Autumn of 1998.'9 This was followed by
the Commission Communication on the implementation of the Financial Services
Action Plan issued in May 1999.20 In these Communications, the Commission

recognized the deficiencies of the existing EC financial market legislation in:
(a) achieving the goal of market integration; and (b) dealing effectively with the
regulatory challenges that an integrated market and modem market developments
brought about, such as cross-border market abuse. Thus, the Commission set out
in the second Communication a framework for the reform of existing legislation,
and the enactment of new legislation in the areas which had not been included in
the preceding harmonization attempts.2' The legislative program and objectives of
this Communication constitute the FSAP.
It is instructive of the extensive scope and volume of the new EC financial
services legislation to note that this legislation brings substantial amendments to

15. Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 93 on the Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and
Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1.
16. Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing up,
Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published When Transferable Securities are Offered to the
Public, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8.
17. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
18. See E. Avgouleas, The Harmonisation of Rules of Conduct in EC Financial Markets: Economic
Analysis, Subsidiariiy and InvestorProtection,6 EUR. L.J. 72, 77-78, 80-81 (2000).
19. Commission Communication, Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action, COM (98)625.
20. Supra note 2.
21. For an appraisal of FSAP see N. Maloney, New Frontiersin EC CapitalMarkets Law: From Market
Constructionto Market Regulation, 40 COMMON MRK. L. R. 809, 811-813 (2003).
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pre-existing EC regulation dealing with: (a) the drawing of disclosure documents
in the context of public offers and listing of securities; (b) the provision of
investment services in the EU and the conduct of cross-border business by
investment firms; (c) the prohibition of insider dealing; and (d) the regime
governing regulated collective investment funds and the ability of their
management companies to use the common passport. The same legislative
measures have introduced new EU-wide regimes for: (a) the regulation of
Alternative Trading Systems ("ATS"); (b) the management of conflicts of
interests and the handling and execution of client orders by investment
intermediaries; (c) the conduct of periodic and continuous disclosures by issuers
of listed securities; (d) the prohibition of market manipulation; (e) the production
and dissemination of investment recommendations; and (f) the conduct of
stabilizations of new issues and share buy backs.
C. The Committee of Wise Men and the "Lamfalussy Process"
The implementation of the FSAP is inextricably bound with the adoption of
the so-called Lamfalussy process. Acknowledging the validity of complaints
about the speed and efficiency with which EC bodies, national legislatures, and
regulators enacted and implemented financial services legislation, the
Commission set up in 2000 the so-called "Committee of the Wise Men." The
mandate given to this Committee was to identify and recommend the most
efficient and timely ("fast track") procedure to debate and enact legislation for
EU securities markets, taking also into account the fast pace of change and
innovation that financial markets have experienced on a continuous basis since
the mid-1980's. The recommendations of the Committee of the Wise Men had
also to be acceptable to the European Parliament. The Committee of the Wise
Men published its Final Report in February 2001.22
The Final Report of the Committee of the Wise Men shared the view of the
financial services industry that keeping pace with emerging market norms and
practices should be of paramount concern for EC bodies in drafting new financial
market legislation. It suggested a new four-level regulatory approach and the
establishment of two committees, which would be involved with the process of
drafting and implementing relevant legislation. First, an EC securities committee
("ESC"). Second, an EU securities regulators' committee with advisory
functions, a role that has been taken by the Committee of European Securities
Regulators ("CESR").
The first two levels of the Committee's proposal are concerned with the "fast
track" production of financial markets legislation by EC bodies, and the
22. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets,
Brussels, 15.02.2001. For a very good exposition of the Lamfalussy process and its intricacies see ELLIS
FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 58-111 (2004) [hereinafter FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU
SECURITIES MARKET].
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remaining two levels facilitate its implementation and consistent application
within EU Member States. The Committee of Wise Men advised that the EC
Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament should produce only
general principle-framework directives, the so-called Level 1 legislation. Level
1 legislation is followed by Level 2 legislation (implementing measures), which
is adopted by the Commission with the assistance of ESC, following consultation
with CESR. Thus, the Committee of the Wise Men recommended adopting the
"comitology" procedure in the production of Level 2 rules to the exclusion from
the drafting (but not the consultation process) of the European Parliament. Level
3 rules are imposed by national regulators through coordinated EU action,
following consultation with CESR, and should be applied consistently across the
EU in order to ensure common and uniform implementation of Level 1 and 2
legislation into the legal orders of the Member States. The final stage in the new
regulatory approach, Level 4, is concerned with the consistent implementation
and enforcement of enacted legislation.
The Stockholm European Council of March 2001 endorsed the final report of
the Committee of Wise Men. The Lamfalussy process has so far been utilized in
the drafting of the Market Abuse Directive, the Transparency Directive, the
POPD II, and the MiFID.
A further legislative package of seven measures (a Directive 23 and six
Commission Decisions) to extend the Lamfalussy process to banking, insurance
and occupational pensions, and to asset management 24 was first released on
November 6, 2003. The aim of the extension of the Lamfalussy process is to
achieve greater and deeper co-operation between banking, insurance and UCITS
supervisors and much greater convergence in day-to-day regulation and
supervision. Six Commission Decisions25 have established the new regulatory
Committees: the European Banking Committee know as EBC and the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee known as EIOPC. The EIOPC,
like ESC, will assist the Commission in adopting implementing measures at
Level 2 for Level 1 legislation in their respective areas. The other committees are
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors ("CEBS") and the Committee
of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors ("CEIOPS")
which will perform in their respective sectors duties similar to those discharged
23. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives
73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC and
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, in Order to Establish a New Financial Services
Committee Organisational Structure, COM(03)659.
24. Commission Press Release, Financial services: Commission Presents Measures to Improve
Regulation of Banking, Insurance and Investment Funds, IP(03)1507.
25. Commission Decision 2004/9/EC of 5 November 2003 Establishing the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Committee, 2004 O.J. (L003) 34; Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 November 2003
Establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 2004 O.J. (L 003)
30; Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 Establishing the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. (L 003) 28; Commission Decision 2004/10/EC of 5 November 2003 Establishing the
European Banking Committee, 2004 O.J. (L 003) 36.
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by CESR. Finally, responsibility for overseeing the implementation of EC law on
collective investment funds has been transferred from the UCITS Contact
Committee to the ESC and CESR.26
The Commission has appointed an expert group, the Inter-Institutional
Monitoring Group ("IIMG"), to evaluate the progress and practical usefulness of the
Lamfalussy process. 2' From the reports of the UMG emerges the clear impression
that there is strong support within the financial services industry for the use of the
Lamfalussy process and the results from its utilization have proved positive, although
a number of important issues remain to be addressed. On November 15, 2004 the
Commission released an internal report that set out its views on the effectiveness of
the Lamfalussy process and its perceived weaknesses in the production and
28
implementation of EC Securities Markets legislation. According to the
Commission, the most distinct strengths of the Lamfalussy process are the "three
Ts"-transparency, trust, and teamwork. The first "has resulted in an improvement in
the quality of legislation and an acceleration of the legislative process, and it has
'
encouraged regulatory and supervisory convergence within Europe.

29

Furthermore,

"the cooperative working framework that has been developed between all the
3°
Institutions, working with regulators, market participants and other stakeholders,"
has likewise contributed to the creation of procedures that enjoy the trust of all
parties involved."1
Endorsing the conclusions of the 11MG reports,32 the Commission sets out in
the same document the main areas of the Lamfalussy process that need further
improvement. These include recommendations for:33
*
"

*

Focusing Level 1 Directives on, above all, general rules and
principles;
Careful calibration of Level 2 technical measures so as to avoid overprescriptive regulation and/or duplicative requirements at the EU
level;
Articulating more clearly the role of Level 3 in the Lamfalussy
process;

26. Commission Decision 2004/8/EC of 5 November 2003 Amending Decision 2001/528/EC
Establishing the European Securities Committee, 2004 O.J. (L 003) 33; Commission Decision 2004/7/EC of 5
November 2003 Amending Decision 2001/527/EC Establishing the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, 2004 O.J. (L 003) 32.
27. Inter-Institutional Monitoring Group, Second Interim Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process,
Brussels, 10 December 2003 & Third Report Monitoring the Lamfalussy Process, Brussels, 17 November 2004
[hereinafter 11MG Third Report].
28. See EC Commission, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process, supranote 3.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at9,T 23.
See 11MG Third Report, supra note 27, at 19, 23-26, 29-31, 33-36 & 39.
EC Commission, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process,supranote 3, at 14-15,

49.
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*

*
*

Strengthening Level 4 through clear, practical arrangements,
whereby the Commission, working with the Member States and
national regulators, should lead a major effort to implement and
enforce effectively the set of existing rules;
Taking steps to obtain better input from consumers in consultation
processes; and
Making sufficient resources available to carry out the required
consultations.

From all of the above the most important is the clear delineation of the role
of national regulators at Level 3 of the Lamfalussy process and the creation of
appropriate supervisory tools for the proper implementation of legislation passed
at Levels 1 and 2. 4 In addition, there is an urgent need for the creation of a
framework for Level 4, the "big unknown" of the Lamfalussy process, especially
with respect to the Commission's powers and responsibilities. Finally, the impact
of the EU Constitutional Treaty,35 signed on October 29, 2004, which provides
specific rules on the use of delegated powers,36 remains unclear given the
uncertainty that surrounds the ratification of this Treaty by EU Member States.
III. THE IMPACT OF MIFID ON MARKET INTEGRATION
A. Rationalesfor the Enactment of MiFID
The implementation of the ISD has brought about clear benefits in respect to
the integration of the internal market in financial services. Its most important
achievement was that it led to the creation of a level playing field between credit
institutions and investment firms and prevented national regulatory regimes from
discriminating against cross-border competition. However, the ISD regime had a
number of weaknesses which prevented it from becoming the steam engine of
market integration. In addition, market developments such as the technological
revolution and the emergence of alternative trading venues, as well as the very
34. CESR has launched a major consultation to clarify the specific content of both Level 3 and Level 4
processes. See CESR, PRELIMINARY PROGRESS REPORT, 'WHICH SUPERVISORY TOOLS FOR THE EU SECURITIES
MARKETS? AN ANALYTICAL PAPER BY CESR, October 2004, CESR 04-333f available at http://www.cesreu.org/ [hereinafterHimalaya Report].
35. Acts that will be adopted under Article 1-36 of the Constitutional Treaty, should the Treaty be
ratified by the EU Member States, will afford the Council and the European Parliament equal control rights over
the Commission's exercise of its delegated powers. To secure its continuing role in the drafting of financial
services legislation under the Lamfalussy process, the Commission has added the following Declaration on
Article 1-36 of the Constitutional Treaty, which has been annexed to the Final Act: "The Conference takes note
of the Commission's intention to continue to consult experts appointed by the Member States in the preparation
of draft delegated European regulations in the financial services area, in accordance with its established
practice." See also EC Commission, The Application of the Lamfalussy Process, supra note 3, at 13. The text of
the Constitutional Treaty can be found at http://ue.eu.intligcpdf/en/04/cgOO/cgOO087-reOl.enO4.pdf.
36. 11MG Third Report, supra note 27, at 39, 43.
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significant increase in cross-border trade, made the ISD look rather outdated. The
main shortcomings of the ISD regime are summarized below:
(1) Technological revolution: In the 1990s, the EU witnessed significant
growth in cross-border trade (both retail and institutional) facilitated
by technology and the proliferation of electronic trading venues,
which were not licensed exchanges. At the time of the adoption of
the ISD, competition between securities exchanges and alternative
trading venues was limited to U.S. markets and relatively unknown
in Europe. As a result, the ISD did not address the regulatory issues
arising by virtue of competition for trading volume between
regulated markets, such as securities exchanges and ATSs, and it did
not provide a comprehensive regulatory framework within which
markets and systems could compete for business.
(2) Internalization: The ISD did not provide a framework for the
execution of client orders internally ("off exchange") by investment
firms and banks, by either matching them "in house" with another
client order, or executing them against a proprietary position. The
traditional regulatory model, on which the ISD was based, made a
clear distinction between the functions of a market intermediary and
those of a marketplace. This structural and institutional dichotomy
allowed a clear distinction to be made between conduct of business
rules, which applied only to intermediaries, and rules governing the
organization and operation of trading venues, mostly applicable to
licensed exchanges. This distinction may not be made anymore in
light of today's competition between different methods of tradeexecution: exchanges, new trading systems, and in-house order
execution by investment firms.
(3) The change in the status of EU securities exchanges: the majority of
EU securities exchanges have gradually become profit driven
corporations the securities of which are often listed, moving away
from the old organizational model of state ownership or mutual
ownership (i.e., ownership by the members of the exchange). As a
result, today, licensed exchanges perform a reduced portfolio of
regulatory duties. In addition, privatized (or demutualized) EU
securities exchanges faced with the challenges of the single market
and of the single currency have sought to expand their activities
beyond national borders and take advantage of new business
opportunities.
(4) Insufficient harmonization of national prudential regulation and
conduct of business regimes: The absence of a clear "country of
origin" regime and the ability of the host state to impose additional
requirements invoking the concept of the "general good" seriously
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inhibited the effectiveness of the ISD passport. In addition, the lack
of comprehensive harmonization of national conduct of business
rules led to continuing compliance with from fifteen to twenty-five
different sets of national conduct of business rules.
(5) Limited scope: The ISD did not cover the full range of services
offered to investors such as the provision of investment advice,
dealing in commodity derivatives, and the production and
dissemination of investment research. The latter was classified as
"ancillary service" under the ISD .3 Thus, the provider of this service
could not enjoy the ISD passport, unless it was also licensed to offer
a "core investment service."
(6) Regulatory cooperation: The ISD provisions for supervisory
cooperation were designed for an era in which linkages between
national financial markets were not intensively employed. As a
result, the ISD did not provide a clear allocation of supervisory and
enforcement responsibilities between national regulatory authorities
within the EU. However, a fully integrated financial market requires
that abusive behavior and other market distortions are pursued,
deterred, and punished on a consistent basis throughout the Union.
Effective cooperation and information exchange between national
authorities is imperative for a well supervised integrated market.
B. Reforming the ISD
MiFID is attempting a giant leap forward in the creation of self-standing
regimes for the regulation of the operation of capital markets, investment firms,
and the provision of investment services in the EU. The formal discussion on the
revised ISD opened with the publication by the Commission of its Communication
("Green Paper") in November 2000.38 The Green Paper discussed a number of
issues relating to the operation and application of the ISD and the Commission
received a very large number of responses. These responses obliged the
Commission to admit that a wide-ranging review of the ISD was required. The
response to the Commission orientations by industry bodies was less than
enthusiastic in a number of areas. For instance, the Commission's suggestions for
the regulation of ATSs were found to be anticompetitive. Following industry
criticism of its proposals, the Commission published a substantially revised set of
recommendations in March 2002. The revised recommendations were also
subjected to open consultation. Relevant responses were taken into account before

37. ISD, supra note 14, at Annex, Schedule C.
38. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council-Upgrading the
investment services directive (93/22/EEC), COM(2000)729 final.
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the submission of the Commission's Proposal in November 2002." Both the4
in its Common Position,
European Parliament in its first reading and the Council
introduced a large number of changes to the Commission's Proposal. Following a
compromise with Council,4' further changes were introduced by the European
Parliament in its second reading which adopted several of the recommendations of
the relevant Parliamentary Committee. In the aftermath of Parliament's favorable
vote, the Directive was formally adopted by the Council of Ministers on April 27,
2004.2 The next section will describe the main characteristics of MiFID.

C. The PrincipalFeaturesand Objectives of the MiFID
1. A New "Constitution"for EU FinancialMarkets
As mentioned above, the most important objective of the MiFID is the
modernization of the EU legal and regulatory regimes governing financial
markets in order to facilitate market integration and enhance investor protection.
The first tool used by the MiFID to achieve the objective of market integration is
43
the detailed harmonization of national supervisory rules. This allows investment
firms to utilize more effectively the "single passport" in order to conduct
investment business throughout the EU on the basis of their home state
authorization. The second tool used is the inclusion in the MiFID of new rules on
access to national clearing and settlement systems and on supervisory
cooperation.
Furthermore, market integration is facilitated through the introduction of a
new core investment service relating to the operation and provision of
multilateral trading facilities ("MTF"), which brings under a common EU
regulatory umbrella the most important ATSs. In the same manner, the MiFID
extends the scope of the new regulatory regime for the carrying out of investment
business in the EU to the provision of investment advice and dealing in
commodity derivatives, which were not covered by the ISD. This allows cross-

39. Proposal for a Directive on Investment Services and regulated markets 2000/12/EC, COM(2002)
625 final.
40. Common Position (EC) No 9/2004 of 8 December 2003, 2004 O.J. (C 060) Ell. The Common
Position was adopted by qualified majority: the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg, Finland, and Sweden voted against
Id.
it.
41. On 30/03/2004 the European Parliament adopted the resolution drafted by Theresa Villiers in line
with a compromise worked out between the rapporteur and the Council, European Parliament Legislative
Resolution on the Council Common Decision for Adopting a Europoean Parliament and Council Directive on
Makrets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. (C 102), PE T5-0212/2004.
42. For an analytical discussion of the different aspects of MIFID and a critical evaluation of its impact
on the structure of the EU financial services industry and the structure and micro-structure of EU capital
markets, see Emilios Avgouleas, The New EC Financial Markets Legislation and the Emerging Regime for
Capital Markets, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 2004 (P. Eechout & T. Tridimas eds., 2005), 321-36
[hereinafter Avgouleas, The New EC Regime for CapitalMarkets].
43. MiFID, supra note 4, arts. 5-13, 16-17.
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border trade in the provision of investment advice and commodity derivatives
dealing to flourish, having been freed from the burden of compliance with
multiple national regimes.
The objective of investor protection is safeguarded by the MiFID through the
establishment of a new regulatory framework for the execution of investor
transactions on exchange, through ATSs, or internally by investment firms. The
MiFID intends to protect investors and the integrity of the market by containing
extensive obligations on both pre-trade and post-trade transparency in equity
transactions and on transaction reporting." In addition, the MiFID lays the
foundations of an EU-wide conduct of business regime. 45
It should be noted here that although MiFID's organizational and
constitutional requirements for "regulated markets," MTFs and investment firms
do not distinguish between equity and debt markets, the MiFID creates a much
less restrictive regime in the case of debt trading. This is largely due to two
reasons: (a) the wholesale nature of this market, where most active players are
professional traders acting either on own account or on behalf of institutional
clients; and (b) fears of migration of trading volume, which would inhibit the
liquidity of EU debt markets. Furthermore, although MiFID's regime for the
prudential regulation of investment firms is much wider and more detailed than
that of the ISD, an analytical examination of this regime is, because of its
volume, outside the ambit of this article.
2.

The Regulation of FinancialExchanges

The MiFID introduces new standards for regulated markets and their
operators. The MiFID provides a definition of "regulated markets" which extends
to all licensed financial exchanges. Accordingly, MiFID provides the
framework for the authorization,47 regulation, and supervision4 s of financial
exchanges in the EU, which shall be further specified at Level 2.4 MiFID
requires that operators of "regulated markets" be "of sufficiently good repute and
sufficiently experienced as to ensure the sound and prudent management of the
regulated market."5 ° The competent authority must ensure, "at the time of
authorisation and on an ongoing basis," that the operator of the market is

44. Id. art. 27-28.
45. Id. art. 18-19.
46. '"Regulated market" means a multilateral system operated and/or managed by a market operator,
which brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-party buying and selling interests in
financial instruments-in the system and in accordance with its nondiscretionary rules-in a way that results in
a contract, in respect of the financial instruments admitted to trading under its rules and/or systems, and which
is authorized and functions regularly and in accordance with the provisions of Title I1.Id. art. 4 (1) (14).
47. Id. art. 36(i).
48. Id. art. 37-39.
49. Id. art. 4(2).
50. Id. art. 37(1).
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endowed with the financial resources needed to secure its orderly functioning.'
Furthermore, the MiFID establishes pre- and post-trade transparency obligations
applicable to orders and quotes in shares displayed in the market and details of
completed equity transactions. "Regulated markets" are required to make public,
on reasonable commercial terms and on a continuous basis, "current bid and offer
prices which are advertised through their systems for shares admitted to trading"
(pre-trade transparency). 2 The display of large size orders and quotes, or of
3
orders and quotes in illiquid securities, may be exempted. For completed trades,
"regulated markets" will have to publish the price, volume, and time for all trades
in equity instruments "concluded under the rules and systems of the market on a
reasonable commercial basis and as close to real time as possible" (post-trade
transparency).54 The reporting of the details of large trades and trades in illiquid
securities could be deferred. The range of orders and quotes to be disclosed will
also be defined by Level 2 implementing measures.
Finally, Article 40 (1) of the MiFID requires financial exchanges to have
"clear and transparent rules regarding the admission of financial instruments to
trading." The requirements of Article 40(1) are only very "high level" principles
and the drafting of detailed rules for the admission of instruments to trading on
"regulated markets" is left to Level 2 implementing measures."
3.

The Regulation of MultilateralTrading Facilities

As mentioned above, the functionality of the operation of Alternative
Trading Systems did not correspond directly to any of the existing ISD services.
Thus, the MiFID introduces a new "investment service" relating to the operation
56
of Multilateral Trading Facilities ("MTFs"). This allows the operators of such
systems to be authorized as investment firms, subject to a customized regulatory
regime. Following the implementation of MiFID by Member States, MTF
operators shall be able to benefit from the Directive's "common passport," and
make their trading facilities and services available to users throughout the EU, on
7
the basis of home country authorization. This means that MTF operators, like all
authorized investment firms, will be required to hold initial capital and an

51. Id. art. 37(3).
52. Id. art. 44 (1).
53. Id. art. 44(2).
54. Id. art. 45(l).
55. Id. art. 40(6). CESR published recently a Consultation Paper setting out its views on the rules that
should govern admission of financial instruments in regulated markets. See Draft Technical Advice on Possible
Implementing Measures of the Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial Instruments-Admission of
FinancialInstruments to Trading on Regulated Markets, CESR/05-023b (2005), available at http://www.cesreu.org/.
56. MiFID, supra note 4, Annex I - List of Services and Financial Instruments, Section A-Investment
services and activities.
57. Id. art. 31(5).
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additional amount of their own funds in accordance with the Capital Adequacy
Directive (93/6/EEC)58

The definition of MTFs in MiFID 9 captures systems, which support the
multilateral disclosure of firm orders/indications of interest between the users of
the system and the execution of orders resulting from the interaction of buy/sell
interests expressed through the system. It also includes "auction-crossing"
systems, where user orders are executed against a reference price imported from
outside the system. The common feature of auction-crossing systems is that they
support autonomous trading decisions by the users of the system, without any
participation of the system operator (against a proprietary trading book) in the
transactions concluded on the system, or any intervention to facilitate trades. The
system supports and facilitates direct user (third-party) interface in a way that
results in a contract.
As mentioned earlier, the MiFID sets out a framework of obligations
applicable to investment firms operating MTFs in order to ensure the objective,
fair, orderly, and efficient handling of trading interests expressed through the
MTF and the efficient execution of orders, which should be based on objective
criteria. 6° In addition, MTF rules regarding the criteria for determining the
admission of financial instruments that can be traded under the system must be
transparent 6' in order to facilitate traders' access to the systems. Moreover, MTF
operators are required "to provide, or ensure" that users have access to "sufficient
62
publicly available information" enabling them to form an informed judgment.
Other rules governing the operation of MTFs require compliance with pretrade and post-trade transparency obligations with respect to equity transactions
concluded on MTFs.i Investment firms operating MTFs do not have post trade

transparency obligations (namely, the obligation to publish data on concluded
trades), where such information is made public under the system of a "regulated
market." 6 Possibilities for deferral of trade reporting, and the range/depth of pretrade disclosure are quite similar to those applicable to regulated markets. 65
MiFID gives the right to MTFs to finalize, clear, and settle transactions
concluded on them through access to central counterparty and clearing and
settlement facilities operated in another Member State.66 Such connectivity is

58. Id. art. 12.
59. '"Multilateral trading facility (MTF)' means a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or
a market operator, which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial
instruments-in the system and in accordance with non-discretionary rules-in a way that results in a contract
in accordance with the provisions of Title W'." Id. art. 4(1) (15).
60. Id. art. 14(1).
61. Id. art. 14(2).
62. Id.
63. Id. arts. 29-30.
64. Id. art. 30(1).
65. Id. arts. 29(2), 30(2).
66. ld. art. 35.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 18
necessary to facilitate the finalization of transactions concluded on MTFs and
safeguard traders' legal rights.
4. Trade Execution by Investment Firms
MiFID has introduced strict "best execution" and "client order handling"
requirements. MiFID also provided a very comprehensive set of rules mandating
the new EU regime for the "best execution" of client orders by investment firms.
This is yet another step towards maximum harmonization, since the ambit and
nature of "best execution" rules had traditionally been determined by Member
States. Accordingly, investment firms acting on behalf of clients may show that
they have provided their clients with "best execution", if they can prove that:
(a) they have exercised due diligence to ensure that the order is executed
67
in the manner most favorable for client conditions, unless the client
has given specific instructions otherwise;
(b) they have developed suitable procedures that enable them to
demonstrate that they have tried to obtain the best deal for the client;
firms must be able to demonstrate to their clients, at the client's
their orders in accordance with the
request, that they have 6executed
8
policy;
execution
firm's
(c) they have informed investors of the different channels through which
their orders may be executed;,and
(d) they have taken measures for the earliest possible execution of
clients' limit orders, 69 and have made public client limit orders with
respect to shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, which
are not immediately executed on the wider marketplace (unless the
client has instructed the firrn otherwise). Firms are deemed to have
complied with this obligation if they have transmitted the orders to a
"regulated market" or an MTF.7 °

67. Id. art. 21(1).
68. Id. art. 21(5).
69. Id. art. 22(2).
70. Id. CESR's views on the specification and clarification of investment firms' duty of best execution
are offered in ch. 3 of CESR's Consultation Paper, Draft Technical Advice on Possible Implementing Measures
of the Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in FinancialInstruments: Aspects of the definition of Investment
Advice and of the General Obligation to Act Fairly,Honestly and Professionallyin the Best Interests of Clients,
Best Execution, Market Transparency,CESR/05-164 (2005) [hereinafter CESR, Second Consultation Paper on
MiFID], availableat http://www.cesr-eu.org/.
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Furthermore, MiFID requires investment firms called "systematic intemalisers"7'
to make their quotes public regularly and continuously, during normal trading
hours.72 On the basis of MiFID's definition of "systematic internalisers," an
investment firm is subject to this obligation only if it deals on its own account client
orders on an "organized, frequent and systematic basis,"' 3 and in sizes up to standard
market size, 4 subject to the qualification that there is a liquid market for the shares in
question. 75 In addition, the MiFID imposes post-trade transparency obligations to
investment firms, which conclude internally or through any other OTC facility, and
outside of a "regulated market" or an MTF, transactions in shares admitted to trading
on a "regulated market." 76 They
77 must make public details of such transactions "as
close to real time as possible.,
MiFID requires investment firms to "take reasonable steps" to identify and
manage, through the establishment of appropriate organizational structures,
conflicts of interest that may arise between themselves and their clients in the
course of providing "investment services" and "ancillary services" to their
clients, 7s as defined in the Annex I of the MiFID. Relevant interests include the
identifiable interests of investment firms' managers, employees, tied agents, and
of any other person "directly or indirectly linked to them by control" or to the

71. "'Systematic internaliser" means an investment firm which, on an organized, frequent, and
systematic basis, deals on own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market or an MTF.
MiFID, supra note 4, art. 4(1)-(7).
72. Id. art. 27(l)-(3).
73. For CESR's views on the content of this qualification see CESR, Second Consultation Paper on
MiFID, supra note 70, at 38-41.
74. According to the Directive the "standard market size" for each share traded by a "systematic
internaliser" is derived by grouping shares "in classes on the basis of the arithmetic average value of the orders
executed in the market for that share." The market for each share comprises "all orders executed in the
European Union in respect of that share excluding those large in scale compared to normal market size for that
share." It follows that "the standard market size for each class of shares shall be a size representative of the
arithmetic average value of the orders executed in the market for the shares included in each class of shares."
MiFID, supra note 4, art. 27(1). Furthermore, the regulator of the most relevant market, in terms of liquidity, on
which the biggest number of transactions for each share is taking place "shall determine at least annually, on the
basis of the arithmetic average value of the orders executed in the market in respect of that share, the class of
shares to which it belongs" and shall make relevant information "public to all market participants." Id. art.
27(2).
75. - Under Art. 25(7) of the MiFID the specific content of the criterion of liquidity, i.e. number and/or
value of transactions remains to be determined at Level 2. CESR has suggested that a share should be deemed to
have a liquid market for the purpose of Article 27 if it satisfies the following criteria: "(a) Trading activity: The
share is traded daily; and (b) The free float of the share is at least 1 billion euro. The free float should be
calculated by excluding those holdings exceeding 5% of the voting rights, as defined in the Transparency
Obligations directive." See CESR, Second Consultation Paper on MiFID, supra note 70, at 43. If CESR's
definition of "liquidity" is adopted by the Commission in Level 2 legislation, then "systematic intemalisers"
will have to fulfill the requirements of Article 27 in all relevant shares, even if these are not liquid in their home
state markets.
76. MiFID, supra note 4, art. 28(1).
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 18.

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 18
interests of different clients of the firm. 9 Where the proper management of
conflicts of interest through the firm's internal mechanisms is not possible and
there remains a reasonable risk that the clients' interests may be damaged, MiFID
requires investment firms to clearly disclose "the general nature and/or sources of
conflicts of interest to the client before undertaking business on its behalf."80
Moreover, MiFID attempts to harmonize, to the extent that it is possible, the
body of conduct of business rules, other than those governing conflict of interests
and best execution, which commonly apply to investment firms in the EU.8"
Member States will, of course, remain free in all areas to impose additional and
possibly stricter national rules. Level 2 detailed rules will differentiate in their
application between different forms of investment services and between
professional and retail clients, who require different forms and intensity of
investor protection.82 Annex II of the MiFID sets out criteria and procedures for
determining when a client can be categorized as a "professional client" for the
purposes of applying the relevant less restrictive conduct of business rules.
D. The Expanded Scope of MiFID
1. The Provision of Investment Advice and Investment Research
The MiFID extends the list of "investment services" that firms may offer on
the basis of the "common passport," on a stand-alone basis, to the provision of
investment advice, which was listed as an "ancillary service" under the ISD. The
principal implications of the inclusion of investment advice to the list of
"investment services" are the following: (a) investment advisors become subject
to MiFID's initial authorization and ongoing supervision obligations, including
initial capital and continuing adequate resources; (b) entities (including natural
persons) providing investment advice as their principal activity will be required
to be licensed as an "investment firm," as opposed to being subject to a variety of
specialized national regimes as at present; and (c) even firms which provide
investment advice on a "stand-alone" basis and not in conjunction with any other
investment business will be able to utilize the common passport and set up a
branch in another Member State or conduct business, on a cross-border basis.
MiFID defines as investment advice: "the provision of personal
recommendations to a client, either upon its request or at the initiative of the
investment firm, in respect of one or more transactions relating to financial
instruments. 83 Therefore, it would seem that the provision of general investment
recommendations to clients or the public at large, in the form of financial

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. art. 18(1).
Id. art. 18(2).
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 19(10).
Id. art. 4(1)(4).
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analysis or research, does not constitute "investment advice" under MiFID.
However, in a recent Consultation Paper, CESR has sought to expand the ambit
of MiFID's definition in order to bring under the "investment advice" regime
"implicit advice" and "generic recommendations."' CESR's chief arguments
pertain to the scope of suitability rules for the provision of investment advice and
the ability of investment firms offering advisory services to utilize MiFID's
passport. Accordingly, in CESR's view it would not be possible for investment
firms to use the exclusion of generic advice from the definition of investment
advice to circumvent the suitability requirement.85 Furthermore, the "exclusion of
generic advice from the definition of investment advice" would mean that
investment firms would not be able to offer full advisory services under MiFID's
passport,8 6 since the production and dissemination of investment research and
analysis is classified as an "ancillary service."87 As the results of the consultation
are pending, no definite view may be offered on this subject.
Arguably, advisory firms, which do not provide any other investment service
or hold client money or assets, do not pose any financial risk to investors. Thus,
initial capital requirements are relaxed for such firms. Sole providers of
investment advice may substitute the initial capital requirement with the much
cheaper and cost efficient professional indemnity insurance.
2. Dealing in Commodity Derivatives and Other Derivative Instruments
Commodity derivatives have been included in the list of financial instruments
covered by the MiFID.
Thus, both trading and intermediation services
concerning these instruments fall within the scope of MiFID. The exclusion of
commodity derivatives from the ISD's definition of financial instruments had
prevented investment firms from using the ISD passport for the cross-border
provision of investment services in commodity derivatives. MiFID plausibly
exempts from its scope firms dealing on their own account,89 which do not need a
regulatory license in order to continue conducting business. As such, entities do
not purport to provide investment services outside a very limited circle of
customers, which usually include affiliated and parent companies. It would have
been very restrictive and unfair to force them to obtain authorization to operate as
investment firms. 90

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See CESR, Second ConsultationPaperon MiFID, supra note 70, at 10-12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
MiFID, supra note 4, Annex I, §B.5.
Id. at §C.
Id. art. 2(1)(i),(k).
See Avgouleas, The New EC Regime for CapitalMarkets, supra note 42, at 354-355.
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The definition of commodity derivatives includes (beyond straightforward
commodity derivatives), futures contracts traded on regulated markets (or
MTFs), which are physically settled, provided that such contracts possess the
characteristics of financial instruments. 9'
Furthermore, the list of financial instruments covered by MiFID extends to a
number of innovative contracts. These contracts include credit derivatives,92
contracts for differences, 93 and derivatives settled in cash or capable to be settled
in cash at the option of one of the parties. The class of derivatives capable of
being settled in cash includes contracts whose subject matter refers to freight
rates, emission allowances, economic statistics, and climatic variables 94 such as
"weather derivatives." In addition, MiFID covers any other derivative contracts:
relating to assets, rights, obligations, and indices, which the Directive does not
mention by name and which have the "characteristics of other derivative
financial instruments," because they are traded on a regulated market or an MTF,
or "are cleared and settled through recognised clearing houses or are subject to
regular margin calls." 95
IV. THE MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE
A. Introduction
At the heart of FSAP sat a proposal for the enactment of a Directive that
would prohibit both insider dealing and market manipulation, replacing the
Insider Dealing Directive.96 In an integrated financial market, investors may
access a multiplicity of trading venues across the EU. The volume of crossborder investment business, including cross-border trading, has significantly
increased in recent years. Investors (retail or institutional) have taken advantage
of opportunities offered by the advent of e-commerce to access for trading
purposes, either directly by using the Internet, or through an intermediary
(regulated markets or Alternative Trading Systems) based in another Member
State. Investor's transactions, as well as the provision of investment services to
them, had to be governed by uniform market conduct rules prohibiting price
manipulation, dissemination of false information, and insider dealing. A uniform
regime protects symmetrically financial markets from abusive practices, which
undermine investor confidence, as shown by the severe "bear market" that
followed the eruption of a series of financial scandals, such as the cases of Enron,

91.
92.

MiFID, supranote 4, Annex I, § C.
Id. § C(8).

93. Id. § C(9).
94. Id. §C(10).
95. Id.
96. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
O.J. (L 334) 30.
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WorldCom and Adelphia and the Wall Street analysts' scandals. This allows
regulatory authorities to cooperate more effectively where necessary to prevent
cross-border abuse from harming investors.
Furthermore, financial institutions, regulated markets and other investment
intermediaries that offered cross-border investment services were required to
comply with the market conduct rules of multiple jurisdictions, subject to the
qualifications of the Court's rule of reason,97 since the EU lacked harmonized
rules on market manipulation.98 This, of course, entailed increased costs of
compliance. In addition, the fact that a plural number of legal orders regulated
the same transaction raised the possibility of rule conflicts.
Faced with these challenges, the Commission correctly perceived a pressing
need to enact harmonized rules for the detection and punishment of market
manipulation and insider dealing. These harmonized rules would remove the
possibility of national rule conflict and of a regulatory "race to the bottom" in the
integrated EU market for financial products. Another advantage of a harmonized
regime was that it would ensure "throughout the Community the same
framework for allocation of regulatory responsibilities, enforcement and
cooperation."99

The Market Abuse Directive'" was formally endorsed in December 2002
following a great deal of consultation. It aims "to ensure the integrity of
Community financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those
markets."' 0 ' It provides an EC wide prohibition of insider dealing and market
manipulation and prohibits selective disclosure. Furthermore, it upgrades the EU
regimes for disclosure of inside information by issuers of financial instruments, and
creates a harmonized regime for, inter alia, the disclosure of analysts' (and other
producers and disseminators of financial information) conflicts of interests. The
respective regimes have been further specified through the enactment of three
Commission Directives, which constitute Level 2 implementing measures. '°2 These

97. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell'Ordine degle Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995
E.C.R. 4165. See also Case C-76/90, Sager v Dennemeyer & Co Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 4221.
98. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, rec. 11.
99. Id. rec. 12.
100. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7.
101. Id. rec. 11.
102. Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards the Definition and Public Disclosure of Inside
Information and the Definition of Market Manipulation, 2003 O.J. (L 339) 70 [hereinafter Commission
Directive on the Definition of Inside Information].Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 22 December 2003 as
Regards the Fair Presentation of Investment Recommendations and the Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest, 2003
O.J. (L 339) 73 [hereinafter Commission Directive on Fair Presentation and Disclosure]. Commission
Directive 2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council Regarding Accepted Market Practices, the Definition of Inside Information in Relation to
Derivatives on Commodities, the Drawing up of Lists of Insiders, the Notification of Managers' Transactions
and the Notification of Suspicious Transactions, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 70 [hereinafter the Accepted Practices
Directive].
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have been supplemented by an EC Regulation, which has established a detailed
EU-wide regime for the carrying out of share buybacks and stabilizations.
B. The Prohibitionof Insider Dealing
1. The Offense
The combined reading of Articles 2, 3, and 4 shows that the Directive
dispenses, in most cases, with the requirement of intent and sets out insider
dealing as an objective, three-pronged offense committed through:
.(a) dealing in ("acquiring or disposing or attempting to acquire or dispose
of') °' financial instruments,"°5 on the basis of inside information, by the
persons listed in Article 2(1), the so-called primary insiders, or any other
person, who possesses inside information,'06 if that person knows, or
7
ought to have known that it is inside information;
(b) the disclosure of inside information by "primary insiders" to third
persons, unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of its
8
employment or profession, or by secondary insiders;' and
(c) a recommendation or inducement made by primary insiders, or by
secondary insiders,' °9 to another person, on the basis of inside
information, to deal in ("acquire or dispose of') financial instruments
to which the information relates." 0°

103. Commision Regulation 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003 Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards Exemptions for Buy-back Programmes and Stabilisation of
Financial Instruments, 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33 [hereinafter Regulationon Share Buy-Backs and Stabilisations].
104. "Member states shall prohibit any person referred to in the second subparagraph who possesses
inside information from using that information by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or dispose
of, for his own account or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, financial instruments to
which that information relates." Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(1).
105. Dealing on the basis of inside information is usually called the "primary offence" of insider
dealing.
106. Usually such persons are called "secondary insiders" or "tippees."
107. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, arts. 2(1) & 4.
108. Id. arts. 3(a) & 4.
109. Id. arts. 3(b) & 4.
110. Disclosing inside information, and recommending or inducing, on the basis of inside information,
constitute the so-called secondary offence of insider dealing, although the Directive does not make such
distinctions.
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The list of "primary insiders" under Article 2(1) includes persons who
possess inside information:
(a) by virtue of their membership of the administrative, management, or
supervisory bodies of the issuer;
(b) by virtue of their holding in the capital of the issuer;
(c) by virtue of their having access to the information through the
exercise of their employment, profession or duties; or
(d) by virtue of their criminal activities.
Therefore, judicial and regulatory authorities do not have to prove that
persons under investigation had an intention to use inside information to obtain a
gain. As intent is usually the hardest element to prove, prosecutors of insider
dealing and similar regulatory actions in the EU have a lesser burden than those
in the U.S. prosecuting cases under section 10(b) of SEA 1934 and SEC Rule
1Ob-5.
Furthermore, if a "primary insider" is a legal person, then the prohibition
extends to the natural persons, "who take part in the decision to carry out the
transaction" on behalf of the legal person in question."' The list of "primary
insiders" is almost the same as that provided under Article 2(1) of the Insider
Dealing Directive," 2 with the addition of the new element of access to inside
information by virtue of criminal activities. This addition was necessitated by the
alleged involvement of organized crime and terrorist groups in securities markets
as a means to profiteer or finance their illegal activities,'13 including instances of
theft of inside information, or of running of extortion rackets aiming at the
acquisition of inside information.
"Secondary insiders" may be acquitted if they prove that they did not know
or did not have to know that they were in possession of inside information." 4 The
determining criterion is what "a normal or reasonable person would know or
should have known in the circumstances.""5 The defense of lack of "actual
knowledge," or of lack of a reasonable obligation to know that the relevant
information was inside information is not available to "primary insiders." 6 In

111. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(2).
112. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
O.J. (L 334) 30.
113. See Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, recs. 17 & 14.
114. Id. art. 4.
115. "Use of inside information can consist in the acquisition or disposal of financial instruments by a
person who knows, or ought to have known, that the information possessed is inside information. In this
respect, the competent authorities should consider what a normal and reasonable person would know or should
have known in the circumstances." Id. rec. 18.
116. Article 4 of the Directive grants the "knowledge" defense only to secondary insiders, whereas
Articles 2 and 3 make no mention of such qualification/defense for primary insiders.
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addition, obtaining a financial benefit, as a result of the actions described in
Articles 2-4, does not seem to be part of the constitutive elements of the offense.
A discussion of the mechanics of insider dealing, its effect on economic
efficiency, and of the rationales for its prohibition are outside the ambit of this
Article.'17 Thus, the next step in the analysis of the offense of insider dealing
under the Directive, is to define what constitutes "inside information."
2. Inside Information
The Market Abuse Directive offers a definition of inside information that is
8
much more complex than that included in the Insider Dealing Directive.' In this
respect, the Market Abuse Directive provides a general definition of "inside
information" and two special (complementary) definitions. Under Article 1(1)
"inside information" means information, which:
(a) is of a precise nature;
(b) has not been made public;
(c) relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers of financial
instruments or to one or more financial instruments; and
(d) if such information was made public, it would be likely to have a
significant impact on the prices of relevant "financial instruments or
on the price of related derivative financial instruments."
This general definition of inside information seems to be applicable to all
persons in possession of inside information and to all financial instruments, other
than commodity derivatives, which fall within the scope of the Directive. The
two special (complementary) definitions of inside information are respectively
used in relation to trading in derivatives on commodities, and in relation to
persons "charged with the execution of orders."
Thus, in relation to derivatives on commodities, inside information means
information of a precise nature, which has not been made public, and which
relates directly or indirectly to one or more derivatives on commodities, provided
that users of markets, on which such derivatives are traded, would expect to
receive such information, in accordance with "accepted market practices" on

117.

See EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKETS ABUSE, A LEGAL AND

EcONoMIc ANALYSIS 75-101, 156-234 (Oxford University Press 2005); chapters 3 and 5 of the same book
provide extensive analysis of the mechanics of insider dealing, its effect on economic efficiency, and of the
rationales for its prohibition.
118. "'Inside information' shall mean information which has not been made public of a precise nature
relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or
securities in question." Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing, art. 1(1), O.J. (L 334) 30.
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those markets. Article 4 of the Commission Directive on Accepted Market
Practices clarifies that users of markets on which derivatives on commodities are
traded, are deemed to expect to receive such information, when this relates
directly or indirectly to one or more derivatives on commodities, and is:
(a) routinely made available to the users of those markets; or
(b) is required to be disclosed in accordance with legal or regulatory
provisions, market rules, contracts or customs on the relevant
underlying commodity market or commodity derivatives market.
Furthermore, in relation to "persons charged with the execution of orders
concerning financial instruments" inside information means information
conveyed by a client, which relates "to the client's pending orders," provided that
it is of a precise nature and relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers of
financial instruments, or to one or more financial instruments, and which, if it
were made public, would be likely to have a significant impact on the prices of
those financial instruments, or on the price of related derivative financial
instruments.
As mentioned above, the first of the special definitions of Article 1(1) applies
only to derivatives on commodities and is inapplicable to all other classes of
financial instruments. Within the ambit of the second special definition falls
intermediate or executing brokers (or any other person "charged with the
execution of orders concerning financial instruments"), who are in possession of
client information regarding their pending orders. The clear target of the second
special definition is the elimination of "front-running.' "9
A careful reading of the general definition of inside information, and of the
two special definitions, leads to the identification of a number of constitutive
elements, which are shared by all of them. First, inside information is
information that: (a) is not public; (b) is of a precise nature; and (c) directly or
indirectly refers to relevant financial instruments (including derivatives on
commodities), or the issuers of financial instruments (excluding derivatives on
commodities) where the issuer is deemed to be of no material importance.
The general definition of inside information and the second of the special
definitions incorporate an element of price sensitivity; namely, that the relevant
information must also have a significant effect on "the prices of financial
instruments, or on the price of related derivative financial instruments." The first
of the special definitions dispenses with this criterion. It replaces the element of
price sensitivity with "information" that users of commodity derivatives markets
would expect to receive in accordance with "accepted practices" on those

markets. 120

119.
120.

See also Market Abuse Directive,supra note 7, rec. 19.
Id. art. 1(1).
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3. Defenses and Safe Harbours
Under Article 8 and Recital 33 of the Market Abuse Directive, trading in
one's own shares in the context of buy-back programs and the stabilization of
financial instruments are exempted from the prohibitions of the Directive, if they
comply with the requirements of the Regulation on share-buy backs and
stabilizations.'' Furthermore, Article 2(3) of the Directive creates a "safe
harbour" from the prohibition of transactions conducted in the discharge of an
obligation (contractual or legal) to acquire or dispose of financial instruments.
This safe harbour exists provided that the relevant obligation has arisen in the
context of an agreement that was concluded before the person concerned
possessed inside information and before the parties' obligations have become
due. 22 In this manner, the Directive protects the certainty of contracts and allows
for the proper performance of pre-existing contractual obligations, which, in the
absence of the "safe harbour" could have been exposed to the threat of
voidability as a result of supervening illegality, creating unnecessary risks in the
conclusion of financial transactions.
In addition, market makers, bodies authorized to act as counterparties (as for
instance, exchanges and related organizations that act as "central
counterparties"), settlement and payment systems, custodians, and persons
authorized to execute orders on behalf of third parties who possess inside
information, will not be found in violation of the prohibition, provided that: (a)
market makers, central counterparties, or settlement and payment systems restrict
themselves to activities that involve the mere buying or selling of financial
instruments; and (b) brokers, who act for third parties, simply carry out "an order
dutifully."' 23 Assuming compliance with the above conditions, market makers and
brokers are afforded a "safe harbour" and their trading activities are not deemed
as constituting use of inside information.
Another "safe harbour" is granted by Recital 29, which provides that the
mere fact of having access to inside information relating to another company and
using it in the context of a public takeover bid for the purpose of gaining control
of that company, or proposing a merger with that company, should not in itself be
deemed to constitute insider dealing. This provision should be read and
interpreted in conjunction with Article 6 of the Directive on Takeover Bids.
Article 6 requires bidders to disclose without delay their decision to make a bid,
and pre-notify the supervisory authority of their decision, being also obliged to
draw in a timely fashion an offer document addressed to the shareholders of the
offeree company.
Furthermore, Article 3(a) creates a clear "safe harbour" from the secondary
offense of disclosure of inside information, where such disclosure is made by a
121.
122.
123.

Supra note 103.
Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(3).
Id. rec. 18.
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person in the normal course of the exercise of his/her employment, profession or
duties. Within the "safe habour" fall directors that discuss the unpublished results
of an issuer with their auditors and bankers, the regulatory and tax authorities,
and the company's lawyers or accountants who share "inside information" with
their co-workers for the purposes of work carried out for the issuer.
Arguably, the obfuscating way that the Directive's "safe harbours" have been
drafted could prejudice their successful application in real market conditions.
Accordingly, the onus falls on national regulators to endeavor to draft properly
calibrated "safe harbours" which are clear in their application, during the
implementation stage.
C. The Prohibitionof Market Manipulation
1. The Offense of Market Manipulation
The second offense proscribed by the Market Abuse Directive is that of
market manipulation. As in the case of insider dealing, the Directive has
dispensed, to the extent possible, with any requirement of intent in the definition
of market manipulation, in order to increase the rate of successful prosecutions
and of similar regulatory actions. Accordingly, under the Directive, market
manipulation is an objective, effect-based offense, at least in the majority of its
manifestations. Under Article 1(2) of the Directive, market manipulation is a
three pronged offense committed through:
(a) transactions or orders to trade:
- which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to
the supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments, or
- which secure, by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, the
price of one or several financial instruments at an abnormal or
artificial level, unless the person who entered into the
transactions or issued the orders to trade establishes that his
reasons for so doing are legitimate and that these transactions or
orders to trade conform to accepted market practices on the
regulated market concerned;
(b) transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any
other form of deception or contrivance; [and],
(c) dissemination of information through the media, including the
internet, or by any other means, which gives, or is likely to give,
false or misleading signals as to financial instruments, including the
dissemination of rumors and false or misleading news, where the
person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known,
that the information was false or misleading.
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The Directive indicates a number of market practices and instances of
market behavior which are likely to amount to market manipulation
under the above definition: 24
- conduct by a person, or persons acting in collaboration, to secure
a dominant position over the supply of, or demand for, a
financial instrument which has the effect of fixing, directly or
indirectly, purchase or sale prices or creating other unfair trading
conditions;
- the buying or selling of financial instruments at the close of the
market with the effect of misleading investors acting on the basis
of closing prices; and
taking advantage of occasional or regular access to the
traditional or electronic media by voicing an opinion about a
financial instrument (or indirectly about its issuer), while having
previously taken positions on that financial instrument and
profiting subsequently from the impact of the opinions voiced on
the price of that instrument, without having simultaneously
disclosed that conflict of interest to the public in a proper and
effective way.
Therefore, the Directive prohibits most known forms of market manipulation
including: (a) trade-based manipulations or misleading trades; (b) artificial
transactions and "wash sales;" and (c) information-based manipulations effected
through the dissemination of false and misleading information.'
The Commission Directive on the Definition of Public Disclosure of Inside
Information and Market Manipulation describes a number of objective (market)
events and perspectives. The Directive suggests that Member States' competent
authorities and market participants must regard these events and perspectives as
"signals" of market manipulation and they should be examined when considering
whether particular behavior constitutes, or may lead to, the first form of market
manipulation: "misleading trades" under Art. 1(2)(a).
2. Defenses and Safe Harboursfor Market Manipulation
In addition to the defenses discussed in section IV.B.3 above, Article 8 and
Recital 33 of the Market Abuse Directive provide that trading in one's own
shares in the context of buy-back programs and the stabilization of financial
instruments are exempted from the prohibitions of the Directive, if they are
Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 1(2).
See AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF MARKETS ABUSE, A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 117, at 103-154 (providing extensive analysis on these types of market
manipulations).
124.
125.
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carried out in accordance with the requirements of the EC Regulation on sharebuy backs and stabilizations. It appears, that, by choosing to enact a Regulation
instead of a Directive, the Commission aimed at the maximum harmonization of
Member State legal and regulatory regimes governing share buy-backs and
stabilizations. 2 6 The use of a Regulation leads to greater legal certainty in the
implementation and application of the relevant rules. This does not, however,
mean that share buy-back schemes and stabilizations that do not comply with the
provisions of the Commission Regulation "should not in themselves be deemed
to constitute market abuse.' 2 7 They should be examined by the Member States'
competent authorities on an ad hoc basis for the purposes of enforcing the
prohibition of market manipulation in the Directive and applying requisite
sanctions.121
The Commission Regulation on share buy-backs and stabilizations defines
buy-back programs as trading (by an issuer) in one's own shares in accordance
with Articles 19 to 24 of Council Directive 77/91 EEC. 29 Under Article 3 of the
Regulation the exemption of the Market Abuse Directive extends only to "buy
back" schemes which lead to reduction of the issuer's share capital, satisfy
obligations arising from debt financial instruments exchangeable into equity
instruments, obligations arising from allocations of shares to employees of the
issuer of an associate company, or by virtue of "employee share option
programmes." In addition, in order to benefit from the share buy-back programs
exemption, issuers must comply with disclosure and trading obligations imposed
by Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Regulation, and with the conditions on share capital
maintenance"' laid down by Article 19(1) of Directive 77/91/EEC (the Second
Company Law Directive),"' requiring the approval of the program by the
competent (company law) authorities.

126. The Regulation has, to large degree, endorsed CESR recommendations following a very extensive
round of consultations on the subject undertaken by CESR and its predecessor FESCO. See Stabilisation and
Allotment, A European Supervisory Approach, Consultative Paper, FESCO (Sept. 15, 2000), Ref. Fesco/00099b,
available at http://www.kredittilsynet.no/archive/stab-word/O1/01/20003002.doc; Second Consultation Paper:
Stabilisation and Allotment-an European Supervisory Approach, FESCO, (June 2001), Ref. Fesco/01-085,
available at http://66.102.7. 14/search?q=cache:y428xkrMUIkJ:www.rahoitustarkastus.fisuomi/saantely/data/laus
untopyynnot/I0592001pmLiite.pdf+fesco+01-085&hl=en.
127. Regulation on Share Buy-Backs and Stabilisations,supra note 103, rec. 2.
128. Id. rec. 3.
129. Id. art. 3.
130. Id. art. 4(1).
131. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on Co-Ordination of Safeguards
which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member States of Companies
within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with Respect to the Formation of
Public Limited Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of their Capital, with a View to
Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1.
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Furthermore, under the Commission Regulation, stabilization may only be
undertaken in connection with "transferable securities" (as defined in the ISD
and now in the MiFID),' which are admitted to trading on a regulated market or
for which a request for such admission has been made, provided that they are
subject to a "significant distribution,"'33 and the stabilization is undertaken
exclusively for the purpose of supporting the market price of securities "due to a
selling pressure in such securities. '" '3 Furthermore, a number of disclosure,
35
reporting, time, and price conditions must be fulfilled.' Accordingly, the
permitted forms of stabilization comprise:
(a) purchases of transferable securities 36 and transactions in "associated
instruments"' 37 undertaken "in the context of significant distribution" of
such securities and exclusively for the purpose of supporting the market
price of these securities (for a predetermined period of time); all
transactions must be conducted by investment firms or credit
institutions,'38 which act for the issuer or the offeror;'3 9 and
(b) the use of ancillary stabilization devices such as
4 the use of the
"overallotment facility"' and of "greenshoe options."' '

132. MiFJD, supra note 4, art. 4(1)(18).
133. Regulationon Share Buy-Backs and Stabilisations,supra note 103, art. 2(6).
134. "Stabilisation" is "any purchase or offer to purchase relevant securities, or any transaction in
associated instruments equivalent thereto, by investment firms or credit institutions, which is undertaken in the
context of a significant distribution of relevant securities exclusively for supporting their market price for a
predetermined period of time, due to a selling pressure in such securities." Regulation on Share Buy-Backs and
Stabilisations,supra note 103, art. 2(7).
135. Id. art. 7-11.
136. Id. art. 2(6), (7).
137. "'Associated instruments" means the following financial instruments (including those which are
not admitted to trading on a regulated market, or for which a request for admission to trading on such a market
has not been made, provided that the relevant competent authorities have agreed to standards of transparency
for transactions in such financial instruments): (a) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of
relevant securities; (b) financial derivatives on relevant securities; (c) where the relevant securities are
convertible or exchangeable debt instruments, the securities into which such convertible or exchangeable debt
instruments may be converted or exchanged; (d) instruments which are issued or guaranteed by the issuer or
guarantor of the relevant securities and whose market price is likely to materially influence the price of the
relevant securities, or vice versa; (e) where the relevant securities are securities equivalent to shares, the shares
represented by those securities (and any other securities equivalent to those shares). Id. art. 2(8).
138. Id. art. 2(7).
139. "'Offeror' means the prior holders of, or the entity issuing, the relevant securities." Id. art. 2(10).
140. "'[O]verallotment facility' means a clause in the underwriting agreement or lead management
agreement which permits acceptance of subscriptions or offers to purchase a greater number of relevant
securities than originally offered." Id. art. 2(13).
141. "'[Greenshoe option' means an option granted by the offeror in favour of the investment firm(s) or
credit institution(s) involved in the offer for the purpose of covering overallotments, under the terms of which
such firm(s) or institution(s) may purchase up to a certain amount of relevant securities at the offer price for a
certain period of time after the offer of the relevant securities." Id. art. 2(14).
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D. Complementary Featuresof the EC Market Abuse Regime
1. Issuer Continuous Disclosure Obligations,Selective Disclosure,
Notifications by Insiders
Article 6(1) of the Market Abuse Directive imposes on financial instruments
issuers that have "requested or approved admission of their financial instruments
to trading on a regulated market in a Member State," a duty to disclose inside
information as soon as possible. The manner that such disclosure must be
effected is clarified by Article 2 of the Commission Directive on the Definition
of Public Disclosure of Inside Information. The relevant disclosure must be made
in such a mode as to allow "fast access and complete, correct and timely
assessment of the information by the public." The same provision requires
prompt disclosure of the occurrence of an event or of a set of circumstances, even
if there is no formal assurance about their occurrence.' 42 It also requests that
publicly disclosed inside information is continuously updated.4 3 The regulatory
authorities of Member States shall ensure that issuers of financial instruments, for
an appropriate period, post on their Internet sites all inside information that they
are required to disclose publicly. The adoption by the Commission of CESR's
recommendation'" that issuers should not disseminate inside information through
45
other channels before it is disclosed through an officially appointed mechanism'
has created additional legal certainty. Disclosure by the issuer of non-public
information through a channel that is not one of the "officially appointed
mechanisms" would not, therefore, constitute proof of timely disclosure.
Article 6(2) of the Market Abuse Directive allows an issuer of financial
instruments to delay the public disclosure of inside information, if such
disclosure would prejudice his legitimate interests. Any such delay must satisfy
two requirements: (a) the omission would not be likely to mislead the public; and
(b) the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of the inside information whose
disclosure has been delayed,' 4 in order to prevent insider dealing.' 47 An issuer

142. Commission Directive on the Definition of the Public Disclosure of Inside Information, supra note
102, art. 2(2).
143. "Any significant changes concerning already publicly disclosed inside information shall be publicly
disclosed promptly after these changes occur, through the same channel as the one used for public disclosure of
the original information." Id. art. 2(3).
144. CESR/02.089b, Advice On Possible Level 2 Implementing Measures For The Proposed Market
Abuse Directive, Consultation Paper, July 2002, at 27.
145. Commission Directive on the Definition of the Public Disclosure of Inside Information, supra note
102, rec. 4.
146. Art. 3(2) of the Directive Commission Directive on the Definition of the Public Disclosure of Inside
Information provides that the issuer ensures the confidentiality of the retained inside information if an issuer
controls access to such information and, in particular, if: "(a) the issuer has established effective arrangements
to deny access to such information to persons other than those who require it for the exercise of their functions
within the issuer; (b) the issuer has taken the necessary measures to ensure that any person with access to such
information acknowledges the legal and regulatory duties entailed and is aware of the sanctions attaching to the

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 18

who has decided to delay the disclosure of inside information for the
reasons must inform the competent authority of this decision
aforementioned
1 48
without delay.
Furthermore, the Market Abuse Directive expressly prohibits selective disclosure
by issuers of financial instruments, regardless of whether the disclosure is made by
the issuer itself, or a person acting for the issuer. 49 Selective disclosure usually takes
the form of disclosure by issuers of non-public information to a selected group of
analysts (selective briefing), and has been the subject of considerable debate over
recent years.
In contrast, the practice seems to encourage favoritism and insider dealing.
Namely, one group of analysts is granted access to price-sensitive issuer data to the
exclusion of other analysts and investors, helping those analysts to publish more
accurate research in exchange for granting the company's management a favorable
review. In addition, it allows the analysts' employer institution, in breach of any
Chinese walls, to trade on the basis of this selectively disclosed non-public
information, profiting at the expense of uninformed investors. Yet the practice of
selective disclosure is thought to be an effective mechanism for the "discreet
leaking" of good or bad news, which filters into the price of the specific issuer's
securities, without the issuer having to disclose detailed information that could be
exploited by its competitors. Selective disclosure acting in this manner does,
arguably, enhance the information and pricing efficiency of financial markets.
In the United States, selective disclosure by issuers was finally prohibited,
following a long debate, with the adoption of SEC Regulation FD (Fair
Disclosure).5 0 The Directive has also opted for a complete prohibition, perceiving it
152
• • market.'-'
as a practice that harms investor confidence in the integrity of the
Arguably, academic opinion does not take such a dim view of selective disclosure.
However, given investor sentiment in the post-Enron era and the serious shift of
regulatory attitudes towards investment analysts, it would have been very difficult to
avoid the resulting blanket prohibition.

misuse or improper circulation of such information; (c) the issuer has in place measures which allow immediate
public disclosure in case the issuer was not able to ensure the confidentiality of the relevant inside information,
without prejudice to the second subparagraph of Article 6(3) of Directive 2003/6/EC." Relevant "effective
arrangements" include the establishment of Chinese walls.
147. Id. rec. 4.
148. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 102, art. 6(2).
149. Id. art. 6(3).
150. Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 17 C.F.R. 243.100-243.103 (Aug. 15, 2000) (prohibiting
management from privately disclosing material non-public information to analysts).
151. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, rec. 24.
152. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative"
Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001), who are firmly in favor of selective disclosure,
favoring analysts over insiders. For a more balanced approach, see Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A BehavioralApproach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 164-176
(2002). As Professor Langevoort observes: "The strongest claim against Reg FD is that it removes a useful
predicate to the efficiency of the stock market, leaving it less well calibrated and more volatile." Id. at 170.
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Article 6(3) of the Market Abuse Directive provides that "whenever an
issuer, or a person acting on his behalf or for his account, discloses any inside
information to any third party in the normal exercise of his employment,
profession or duties ... he must make complete and effective public disclosure of

that information." Effective public disclosure of the information in question must
be made through officially appointed mechanisms. The disclosure of relevant
information should take place either simultaneously with any selective briefing to
a third party, in the case of intentional disclosure, or "promptly in the case of a
non-intentional disclosure." There is no obligation to effect simultaneous
disclosure, where the person receiving the information owes a regulatory,
contractual or otherwise imposed duty of confidentiality. This is, of course, a
"safe harbour" covering disclosure of inside information to the issuer's
nonexecutive directors, its lawyers, auditors and other professional consultants for
the purpose of facilitation of the issuer's business, the auditing of its financial
statements or the carrying out of due diligence surveys for the purpose of a
merger or an acquisition.
Finally, issuers and "persons acting on their behalf or for their account," are
required to draw up lists of persons "working for them, under a contract of
employment or otherwise, who have access to inside information." The relevant
lists shall be regularly updated, and capable of being transmitted "to the
competent authority whenever the latter requests it. ' 5 3
Article 6(4) of the Market Abuse Directive requires from "[p]ersons
discharging managerial responsibilities within an issuer of financial instruments
and, where applicable, persons closely associated with them" to notify the
relevant competent authority of any transactions conducted on their own account
relating to shares of the issuer in question, "or to derivatives or other financial
instruments linked to them." This form of information is particularly relevant in
order to monitor the compliance of such persons with the prohibition of insider
dealing. It also constitutes very important market information and its disclosure
significantly enhances both the transparency and the information efficiency of the
marketplace.5 4 For this reason, the Market Abuse Directive requires Member
States to ensure that "public access to information concerning such transactions,
on at least an individual basis, is readily available as soon as possible."' 5

153. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(3).
154. "Greater transparency of transactions conducted by persons discharging managerial responsibilities
within issuers and, where applicable, persons closely associated with them, constitutes a preventive measure
against market abuse. The publication of those transactions on at least an individual basis can also be a highly
valuable source of information to investors." Id. rec. 26; Commission Directive on Accepted Market Practices,
supra note 102, rec. 7.
155. Market Abuse Directive, supra note 7, art. 6(4).
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2. Investment Recommendations and Disclosure of Interests
Article 6(5) of the Market Abuse Directive requests Member States to
implement regulations which will oblige producers and disseminators of
investment research and investment recommendations to fairly present "research
concerning financial instruments or issuers of financial instruments" and
information "recommending or suggesting investment strategy," where such
research or investment recommendation is intended for submission to distribution
channels or for dissemination to the public and not for internal use. The same
persons are assigned the duty to disclose relevant interests and conflicts of interests
"concerning the financial instruments to which that information relates."
The Directive addresses through the introduction of the dual duty of "fair
presentation" and disclosure of interests and conflicts of interests, the very serious
issue of production and dissemination of tainted investment research. The purpose
of such research is usually to serve the interests of the producer (or of the
disseminator), even if this is proved to be to the detriment of investors, who will
rely on its findings or recommendations. The best-known examples of published
investment analysis guided by colossal conflicts of interests are the investment
reports and recommendations produced by "star analysts" within major U.S.
investment banks during the 1990s.116 Analysts' reports were intentionally partial as
they were consistently utilized by the analysts' employer institutions in order to
obtain investment banking business. Their over-optimism had an appreciable
impact on the creation of the stock market bubble of the 1990s.
The revelation of the extent to which such reports were tainted,'57 created a
serious crisis of confidence for U.S. investment banks and the global financial
markets. It also led to the imposition of very significant sanctions on both the
analysts concerned and their employers.' 8 The U.S. reforms included, with respect
156. The Attorney General for the State of New York opened his statement on the so-called "Wall Street
Settlement" (with most of the major U.S. investment banks involved in the misleading research scandal) with
the following words: "When my office began investigating conflicts of interest at Wall Street investment firms
nearly two years ago, there was a prevailing sense that if problems existed they were the result of actions by a
few rogue individuals. However, it soon became clear that firms routinely disseminated tainted investment
advice that was designed to help investment banking clients but which harmed individual investors. It was also
clear that systemic reform was imperative." Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Statement
by Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Regarding the "Global Resolution" of Wall Street Investigations' (Apr. 28,
2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/globalresolution.html.
157. As reported by the FinancialTimes, the final settlement "included findings of fraud against three
banks-Citigroup's Salomon Smith Barney unit, Credit Suisse First Boston and Merrill Lynch. The regulators
also released evidence showing alleged conflicts of interest at other leading banks including Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley." See Joshua Chaffin et al., TougherAction Urged against Wall St Banks, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
28, 2003.
158. "Regulators are turning up the heat on those who let abuses of investor trust occur during the bull
market of the late 1990s, those whom investors were told would be pursued after Wall Street reached the
research settlement in April. Last Friday, the banks found out just how high regulators would look. So far, the
only individuals punished have been analysts such as Merrill Lynch's Henry Blodget and Citigroup's Jack
Grubman. Both have been fined and barred from the industry." Regulators Turn up the Heat on Wall Street,
FIN. TIMES, June 3, 2003.
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to production and dissemination of investment research:" 9 (a) clear separation of
the research and investment banking divisions at firms;' 6 (b) new mechanisms for
providing independent research to investors at no cost to help them make more
informed decisions;16 ' and (c) transparency of rating information.
There is hope that the utilization of the Market Abuse Directive's dual duty
of "fair presentation" of research and disclosure of interests'62 will similarly
minimize the risk of dissemination of false or misleading information through the

production and dissemination of investment research and recommendations
enabling investors to rely on the accuracy, objectivity, and reliability of analysts'
reports.
The Commission Directive defines investment "recommendations" as "research
or other information recommending or suggesting an investment strategy, explicitly

or implicitly, concerning one or several financial instruments or the issuers of
financial instruments, including any opinion as to the present or future value or price
163
of such instruments, intended for distribution channels or for the public.'
Furthermore, Article 1(4) of the Commission Directive on Fair Presentation and
Disclosure of Interests defines the term (of Article 6(5) of the Market Abuse

Directive) "[r]esearch or other information recommending or suggesting investment
strategy," as:
(a) information produced by an independent analyst, an investment firm,
a credit institution, any other person whose main business is to

produce recommendations or a natural person working for them
under a contract of employment or otherwise, that, directly or

indirectly, expresses a particular investment recommendation in
respect of a financial instrument or an issuer of financial instruments;
(b) information produced by persons other than the persons referred to in
(a) which directly recommends a particular investment decision with
respect to a financial instrument.

159. Other measures included: (a) a ban on IPO spinning-investment firms will no longer be allowed
to allocate to officers or directors of public companies preferential access to valuable IPO shares of corporations
from which they have sought or obtained investment banking business; (b) the appointment of independent
monitors for each firm-a monitor would report to regulators on the firm's compliance with the terms of the
agreement; (c) investor education-programs would be established to help investors protect themselves against
securities fraud; and (d) the largest overall monetary payments in Wall Street history-$1.4 billion. See Joint
SEC/NYAG/NASAA/NASD/NYSE Press Release, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
160. Analysts would be insulated, and they would no longer be allowed to solicit business or accompany
investment bankers on pitches and road-shows, or identify investment banking prospects. Investment banking
would not be allowed input into analyst evaluation and compensation.
161. The rationale for the adoption of this measure was that independent research would guarantee that
alternative views are made available to the retail customer, and also make the analyst aware that he or she is
being judged on the basis of comparative independent analysis.
162. Market Abuse Directive, supranote 7, art. 6(5).
163. Commission Directive on FairPresentationand Disclosure,supra note 102, art. 1(3).
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Accordingly, securities research reports produced by investment firms and credit
institutions, and securities research reports produced by independent research
institutions, which fulfill the above criteria, fall within the ambit of Article 6 (5) of
the Market Abuse Directive. Nevertheless, the production and dissemination of
macro-economic analysis, general market commentary, and research concerning
broad markets, which do not carry investment recommendations, need not comply
with the above duties. Also, credit rating agencies' reports on the creditworthiness of
specific issuers fall outside the above definition of investment "recommendations."' 6'
Articles published in the press that disseminate the findings of investment
research or recommend investment strategy could be seen as falling within the
scope of Article 6(5), and they must incorporate disclosure of relevant interests
or conflicts of interest. However, the Commission leaves it to the discretion of
Member States to determine the form of applicable regulation, including selfregulation in this area.165 This unsatisfactory solution was reached because the
Commission was particularly intent on avoiding any conflicts between the
Directive and the constitutional protection of the rights of free expression in
Convention for the Protection
Member States' legal orders,' 66 and the European
67
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.1
V. POPD II AND THE TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE
A. Introduction
POPD II has replaced the Listing Particulars Directive of 1980 and the Public
Offer Prospectus Directive of 1989; both codified by the Securities Consolidation
Directive of 2001 .6sIt provides a harmonized regime for drawing up and
scrutinizing the disclosure documents used for the public offer of equity and nonequity securities, or the admission of such securities to trading on regulated
markets in the EU. The Directive provides a definition of what constitutes an
"offer of securities to the public," which it extends to the placement of securities
though financial intermediaries. It grants the issuer of the securities a "single
passport," which, on the basis of the country of origin principle, enables the

164. Id. rec. 10. The Commission has recently consulted on possible new legislation governing the
operation of credit rating agencies and the production of their ratings. See EC COMMISSION, CALL TO CESR FOR
TECHNICAL ADVICE ON POSSIBLE MEASURES CONCERNING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (July 27, 2004),
available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/securities/docs/agencies/2004-07-27-advice-en.
pdf. The core issues that the Commission thinks that should be tackled by EC regulation are: "(i) potential
conflicts of interests within rating agencies; (ii) transparency of rating agencies' methodologies; (iii) legal
treatment of rating agencies' access to inside information; and (iv) concerns about possible lack of competition
in the market for provision of credit ratings." Supra note 102, at 2.
165. Id. art. 2(4).
166. Id. rec. 11.
167. Id.
168. POPDII, supra note 5.
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issuer or offeror to offer the securities in any EU Member State, or have them
admitted to trading on any regulated market located within the EU without
having to comply with any regulatory requirements, other than those imposed by
the country, where the offer was first made or the securities were first admitted to
trading.
One of the main concerns of the legislature was to avoid creating a rigid, onesize-fits-all disclosure regime that would place overly burdensome compliance
costs on SME's, prejudice the development of the London Eurobonds market,
and/or stifle market innovation. The draft directive became the subject of fierce
debate and disagreement during the consultation process, and this led to a
hesitant political compromise. As a result, it is doubtful whether the multidocument format of the passported prospectus, one of the most important
innovations in this context, will ever be utilized by the critical mass of EU or
third country issuers. Furthermore, POPD II has not been successful at creating a
"lighter touch regime" for SME's. 169 It is also puzzling why EU policymakers
have not addressed, with the degree of seriousness required, the necessity and
desirability of such an extensive, detailed and inflexible regime for mandatory
disclosure and its costs. Nor has there been any debate (with the exception of a
limited number of academic voices) 70 about the possible interplay between
17
mandatory regulation and self-regulation in the area of issuer disclosure rules.
B. The Main Featuresof POPD H
1. The POPDII Prospectus
A prospectus drawn under the Directive must contain all the information
which, according to the particular nature of the issuer and of the securities
offered to the public or admitted to trading, is necessary to enable investors to
make an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer and any guarantor of the rights
attaching to such securities. "2 This information must be presented in an easily
analyzable and comprehensible form. The Directive's disclosure requirements, as
169.

See

FERRAN,

supra note 22, at 179-180. For a perceptive critical assessment of POPD II, see

FERRAN, at 201-205.

170. See, e.g., Eddy Wymeersch, Regulating European Markets: The Harmonisation of Securities
Regulation in Europe in the New Trading Environment, in REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY 189, 196-200, 204-206 (Eilis Ferran & Charles Goodhart eds., 2001).
171. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA L. REV. 1453 (1997); Merritt B. Fox,
Securities Disclosurein a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); J.
Holland, Economic incentivesfor the Self-Regulation of the Release of Price-SensitiveInformation, 221 EUR. J.
L.& ECON. 221 (1996); Daniel R. Fischel, Organised Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common
Stock, 54 CH. L. REV. 119 (1987); Emilios Avgouleas, Financial Market Regulation and the New Market
Landscape: In Search of a New Regulatory Frameworkfor Market Abuse, 2 INT'L COMP. CORP. L. J. 89, 116117 (2000).
172. POPD 1, supra note 5, art. 5.
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specified by a Level 2 Regulation,' 73 reflect to a significant extent the standards
for cross-border offerings of the International Organisation of Securities
Commissions.
A prospectus drawn in accordance with the provisions of the Directive
should include a "summary," which is a brief statement, no more than 2,500
words, drafted in non-technical language in order to convey to investors the
essential characteristics and risks associated with the issuer, any guarantor and
the securities. 1 ' The prospectus, subject to the updates76dictated by Article 16
months.'
(filing of supplements) remains valid for twelve
The Directive grants the issuer of securities, once the prospectus has been
approved by the competent authority, the right (via a "single passport") to offer
its securities anywhere in the EU or have them admitted to trading on a regulated
market located in any EU Member State.
One of the biggest innovations of the Directive is that it allows issuers to
divide the prospectus into a number of documents. Thus, issuers and offerors, at
their discretion, may either draw a prospectus as single document or divide the
documents: 17
information to be disclosed into the following
(a) "Registration document:" containing the information relating to the
issuer;
(b) "Securities note:" containing the information concerning the
securities to be offered to the public or be admitted to trading on a
regulated market; and
(c) "Summary note.

173. Commission Regulation (CE) 809/2004 of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to information contained in prospectuses as well as the
format, incorporation by reference and publication of such prospectuses and dissemination of advertisements,
[2004] OJ L149/1. The Regulation lays down: (1) the format of the prospectus referred to in Article 5 of the
Directive; (2) the minimum information requirements to be included in a prospectus provided for in Article 7 of
the Directive; (3) the method of publication referred to in Article 10 of the Directive; (4) the modalities
according to which information can be incorporated by reference in a prospectus provided for in Article 11 of
the Directive; (5) the publication methods of a prospectus in order to ensure that a prospectus is publicly
available according to Article 14 of the Directive; and (6) the methods of dissemination of advertisements
referred to in Article 15 of Directive.
174. IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL
LISTINGS BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.
pdf.
175. POPDII, supra note 5, art. 5(2), rec. 21.
176. Id. art. 9(1).
177. "A prospectus composed of separate documents shall divide the required information into a
registration document, a securities note and a summary note. The registration document shall contain the
information relating to the issuer. The securities note shall contain the information concerning the securities
offered to the public or to be admitted to trading on a regulated market." Id. art. 5(3).
178. "A prospectus composed of separate documents shall divide the required information into a
registration document, a securities note and a summary note. The registration document shall contain the
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Another innovation of the Directive is the introduction of a "base
prospectus." A base prospectus may be drawn in the case of programs for nonequity securities such as notes and warrants of any form, and for continuous and
repeated issues of non-equity securities by credit institutions. ' The base
prospectus remains valid for twelve months.'
A number of other innovations introduced by POPD II aim also at fostering
market integration by facilitating cross-border offers of financial instruments and
multiple admissions to trading (e.g., cross-listings). Accordingly, the Directive:
(a) Allows for the incorporation of documents containing information
required to be disclosed in the prospectus by reference to one or
more previously or simultaneously published documents that have
been approved by the competent authority of the home Member
State;'
(b) Harmonizes the law on the publication of prospectuses'8 2 and
advertisement of public offers;'83

(c) Introduces a new concept of "language that is customary in the
sphere of international finance" that may be used in prospectuses
drawn in relation to cross-border offers or multiple admissions to
trading." Thus, issuers' obligation to translate the full prospectus in
case of multi-jurisdictional offers is abolished-the home and host
state regulators may only require the translation of the summary
85
prospectus into their official language; and
(d) Requires, in the same mode with the Market Abuse Directive, the
establishment of a single competent authority for the scrutiny and
approval of the public offer and admissions prospectus, which should
be an administrative authority "completely independent from all
market participants.' 8 6 This provision excludes privatized securities
exchanges from discharging the role of the competent authority,
unless Member States allow the central competent authority to

information relating to the issuer. The securities note shall contain the information concerning the securities
offered to the public or to be admitted to trading on a regulated market." Id. art. 5(3). Furthermore, Article 12(1)
provides that an issuer which already has a registration document approved by the competent authority is
required to draw up only the securities note and the summary note when securities are offered to the public or
admitted to trading on a regulated market.
179. Id. art. 5(4).
180. Id. art. 9(2).
181. Id. art. 11.
182. Id. art. 14.
183. Id. art. 15.
184. Id. art. 19.
185. Id.
186. Id. art. 21(1).

218
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delegate to them specified powers with respect to scrutiny and
approval of public offers and admissions prospectus.'87 Any such
delegation of tasks under the Directive is to be reviewed by 2008 and
end in 2011.88
Finally, the Directive requests Member States ensure that their laws,
regulations, and administrative provisions on civil liability apply to those
9
responsible for the information given in a prospectus. Arguably, issuers or even
the offerors do not have much involvement with the drafting of an offer or
admission prospectus, as this is a job usually entrusted to professionals such as
investment bankers, corporate lawyers, tax specialists, and translators. As a
result, the Directive defines "persons responsible for drawing up the prospectus"
and for auditing the financial statements as directors, senior management,
advisers, and auditors.' 9° A possible "safe harbour" is created for the professional
advisers who have drafted the summary under Article 5(2)(d) of the Directive,
which provides that such persons-frequent litigation targets because of their
"deep pockets"-are liable only if the "summary" is misleading, inaccurate or
inconsistent when read together with the other parts of the prospectus.
2. Exemptions
The lack of a comprehensive definition of the institutional and professional
investors exemption under the previous regime created conditions of market
fragmentation and insurmountable problems in the conduct of private placements
on a Pan-European basis. For this reason, the Directive introduces a formal
private placement and professional investors' exemption. As a result, there is no
obligation to draw a prospectus where the offer of securities is addressed solely
to qualified investors and/or where the number of offerees is up to 100 natural or
legal persons per Member State, other than qualified investors (private
placement).' 9' Subsequent resale of the securities by qualified investors or private
placees shall be regarded as a separate offer and may be caught by the public
offer regime. Under the Directive, the term "qualified investor" means:
(a) "Legal entities which are authorised or regulated to operate in the
financial markets, including: credit institutions, investment firms,
other authorised or regulated financial institutions, insurance
companies, collective investment schemes and their management
companies, pension funds and their management companies,

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. art. 21(2).
Id.
Id. art. 6(2).
Id. Annex I & Annex
Id. art. 3(2).

m1.
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commodity dealers, as well as entities not so authorised or regulated
whose corporate purpose is solely to invest in securities;"' 9
(b) "national and regional governments, central banks, international and
supranational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund,
the European Central Bank, the European
Investment Bank and other
93
similar international organizations;'

194
(c) other legal entities which are not small or medium-sized enterprises;

(d) natural persons, subject to mutual recognition, if they expressly ask
to be considered as qualified investors and meet at least two of the
following criteria:195
(i) "the investor has carried out transactions of a significant size on
securities markets, at an average frequency of, at least, 10 per
' 96
quarter over the previous four quarters;'
(ii) "the size 7 of the investor's securities portfolio exceeds 0,5 million
91
euros;"'

(iii) "the investor works or has worked for at least one year in the
financial sector in a professional position which requires knowledge
of securities investment."' 198
(e) SMEs which have expressly asked to be considered as "qualified
investors."' 9 In accordance with Article 2(1)(f) of the Directive, SMEs
are companies which, in light of their last annual or consolidated
accounts, meet at least two of the following three criteria: the average
number of employees during the financial year is less than 250, their
balance sheet does not exceed 43,000,000 euros, and their annual
turnover does not exceed 50,000,000 euros.2 °
Public offers or admissions to trading of units of collective investment vehicles,
government securities, and securities issued or guaranteed by central banks or other
defined public bodies are not subjected to the obligation to issue a prospectus,
because these instruments fall outside of the scope of the Directive.' Securities
issued under debt programs established by credit institutions are also exempt, when

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. art. 2(l)(e)(i).
Id. art. 2(1)(e)(ii).
Id. arts. 2(1)(e)(iii), 2(1)(D.
Id. art. 2(1)(e)(iv).
Id. art. 2(2)(a).
Id. art. 2(2)(b).
Id. art. 2(2)(c).
Id. art. 2(1)(e)(v).
Id. art. 2(1)(0.
Id. art. 1(2).
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the total consideration of the offer is less than 50,000,000 euros, provided that the
relevant securities are not exchangeable or convertible, the issued debt is not
subordinated, and the securities do not serve as rights warrants nor are linked to
derivative instruments.0 2 Furthermore, certificates of deposit and other money
market instruments2 3 and securities included in an offer where the total consideration
2°
for the offer is under 2,500,000 euros also fall outside of the scope of the Directive.
Finally, POPD II provides exemptions based on numerical thresholds, which are
quite similar to those provided by its predecessor, Prospectus Directive 1989. These
exemptions may be utilized cumulatively with the "qualified investors" exemption
and the "private placement" exemption for offers to fewer than 100 natural or legal
persons. Thus, there is no obligation to draw a prospectus where:
(a) the total consideration is at least 50,000 euros per investor for each
separate offer;
(b) the denomination of the offered securities is at least 50,000 euros; or
(c) the consideration for the entirety of the offered securities does not
25
exceed 100,000 euros over a period of 12 months.
C. The TransparencyDirective: Objectives and Main Features
The Directive on Transparency Obligations of Traded Companies was adopted
by the Council of Ministers, which agreed with Parliament's amendments effected in
the first reading of the Directive on May 11, 2004, yet the formal adoption of the
Directive was secured several months later.2" This Directive complements the
Market Abuse Directive, the EC Regulation on International Accounting Standards,
or Regulation IAS,2°7 and the POPD 1I in constructing an all encompassing EU
market integrity regime. It introduces new disclosure (transparency) requirements
with regard to information on issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market in the EU. The main objectives of the Directive are summarized
below.
The Directive aims at improving the EU regulatory framework governing the
reports that issuers of securities admitted to trading on a regulated market produce on
a regular basis. It mandates publishing an annual financial report within four months
from the end of the financial year.2(a In the case of depositary receipts representing
securities, an issuer is regarded as the issuer of the underlying securities.
202. Id. art. 1(2)(j).
203. Id. art. 1(2) (f).
204. Id. art. 1(2) NI).
205. Id. art. 3(2).
206. Transparency Directive, supra note 8.
207. Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting
standards, 2002 O.J. (L243) 1.
208. Transparency Directive, supra note 8, art. 4.

2005 /A CriticalEvaluation of the New EC Financial-MarketRegulation
Another improvement the Directive brings about is in the area of issuer
periodic disclosure obligations, through the introduction of mandatory periodic
disclosure obligations for issuers of debt securities. These must be made public
as soon as possible after the end of the relevant six-month period, and at the latest
two months thereafter. 2°9 Exemptions to the above obligations are provided for
credit institutions whose shares are not admitted to trading on a regulated market
and who have only issued debt securities in the context of a "program," provided
that the total nominal amount of all such debt securities remains below 100
million and that they have not published a POPD II prospectus. 2'0 An exemption
is also granted to issuers of debt securities, who have not issued shares, on the
basis of an individual denomination per unit starting at 50,000 euros. "
Issuers of shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, who do not
publish quarterly reports acting under a national law obligation or on their own
initiative, acquire an obligation to publish half-yearly statements by its
management, which shall contain information covering the period from the
beginning of the relevant six-month period to the date of publication of the
statement.2 2 The management statement should include at least indication of
important events that occurred during the first six months of the financial year
and their impact on the condensed set of financial statements, together with a
description of the principal risks and uncertainties for the remaining six months
of the financial year.2

3

,

In addition, the Directive acts in a complementary way with Article 6(1) of
the Market Abuse Directive on the issuer's obligation to publish price-sensitive
information on a continuous basis.2

4

Moreover, the Directive lowers the threshold for the reporting of changes to
important shareholdings (5%) and provides procedures for the notification and
disclosure of major shareholdings and their acquisition or disposal where the
proportion of voting rights of the issuer held by the shareholder as a result of the
acquisition or disposal reaches, exceeds, or falls below the thresholds of 5%,
10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%.25 The notification obligation extends
to the rights of a natural person or legal entity to acquire, to dispose of, or to
exercise voting rights attached to shares held by a third party in various ways,
including shares held as collateral or placed in the hands of depositary for safe
custody.2

6

209. Id. art. 5(1)
210. Id. art. 8(2).
211. Id. art. 8(1)(b).
212. ld. art.6.
213. Id. art. 6(1).
214. Id. arts. 16(1), 21(6).
215. Id. arts. 9 and 12.
216. Id. art. 10.
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Article 20 of the Directive introduces into annual and periodic reports the
concept of language customary in the international sphere of finance. This may
be used for ongoing disclosure by issuers of securities with cross-border listings,
and also may be chosen by issuers who offer their securities to the wholesale
market (e.g., issuers of Eurobonds).
Furthermore, the Directive harmonizes EU issuers' reporting obligations with
18
certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act" on issuer reporting. The most
prominent example is the inclusion in the yearly and half-yearly reports of statements
made by persons responsible within the issuer to the effect that financial statements
and the condensed financial statements have, to the best of their knowledge, been
prepared in accordance with the applicable set of accounting standards and give a
true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position, and profit or loss of the
issuer.211
Finally, liability, including civil liability, for the accuracy of the aforementioned
reports is attached to the issuer or its administrative, management, or supervisory
bodies and persons responsible within the issuer for drawing up and making public
relevant information.2
A number of other important features of the Transparency Directive are
summarized below.
First, the Directive delegates the supervision of issuer compliance with ongoing
and period disclosure obligations to the same competent authority that scrutinizes the
POPD II prospectus. Therefore, this power is also removed from securities
exchanges and other regulated markets and transferred to the relevant capital market
221
commission.
used in the Directive refers to
Second, the concept of the home Member State
222
"annual financial report"
The
securities.
issued
the
to
not
the issuer and
consists of the audited
and
information
constitutes a complete source of financial
financial statements, the management report and statements made by persons
responsible within the issuer.223
Third, the half-yearly report comprises a condensed set of financial
2
statements and a management report on company activities. In the case of an
issuer required to prepare consolidated accounts, the condensed set of financial
statements must be prepared in accordance with IAS 34, applicable to the interim
financial reporting adopted pursuant to the procedure provided for under Article
6 of Regulation (EC) 1606/2002. Where the issuer is not required to prepare

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. art. 20.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266 (2002).
Transparency Directive, supra note 8, arts. 4(2)(c) & 5(2)(c).
Id. art. 7.
id. art. 24(l).
Id. art. 2(1)(i).
Id. art. 4(2).
Id. art. 5(2).
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consolidated accounts, the condensed set of financial statements shall at least
contain a condensed balance sheet, a condensed profit and loss account, and
explanatory notes on these accounts.
Finally, when the registered office of the issuer is in a third country, the
competent authority of the home Member State may exempt that issuer from the
periodic and continuous disclosure requirements of the Directive, provided that
that the law of the third country concerned provides equivalent requirements or
the issuer in question complies with requirements of the law of a third country
that the competent authority of the home Member State considers as equivalent.225
In addition, an issuer whose registered office is in a third country may be
exempted from preparing its financial statements (for its annual and half-yearly
reports) in accordance with Article 4 or Article 5 prior to the financial year
starting on or after January 1, 2007, provided that such issuer prepares its
financial statements in accordance with internationally accepted standards
referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EC) 1606/2002.
The Commission shall, inter alia, through the issue of Level 2 implementing
measures: (a) determine the technical conditions under which a published halfyearly financial report is to remain available to the public; (b) clarify the nature
of the auditors' review; and (c) specify the minimum content of the condensed
balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, and explanatory notes on these accounts
where they are not prepared in accordance with the International Accounting
Standards, pursuant to the procedure provided for under Article 6 of Regulation
(EC) 1606/2002.
The usefulness of the Transparency Obligations Directive has been
questioned in many quarters of the European financial services industry. Since
most Member States have already enacted legislation that mandates the filing of
quarterly reports by listed companies and have set very low thresholds for the
reporting of changes in important shareholdings, the Directive does not seem to
present any major breakthrough in the reporting regime of EU and third country
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading in European markets.
VI. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE NEW EC FINANCIAL
MARKETS LEGISLATION

A. General Observations
The new EC financial market legislation comprises a mix of deregulatory and
protective rules, which serve the dual purpose of liberalization in order to achieve
market integration and investor protection in the integrated market. Thus, FSAP
legislation preserves the "synthetic" approach regarding its objectives of
liberalization and investor protection, regardless of whether the concurrent

225.

Id. art. 23(1).
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pursuit of both is the most effective means for their achievement." 6 The objective
of liberalization is directly related to the pursuit of market efficiency, and the
objective of investor protection is related to the achievement of fairness in the
market. However, a number of arguments have been raised in recent years
objecting to the concurrent pursuit by lawmakers of the economic efficiency and
fairness objectives and pointing to the intrinsic tension, if not outright conflict,
between the two.22 An example of such tension may prove to be the discussed
trade transparency measures in MiFID, which have a distributional objective as
they favor investors over investment intermediaries. 8 However, they could prove
detrimental to both market efficiency and investors if they adversely affect
liquidity levels in EU capital markets. 9
The volume of legislation to be implemented and complied with, especially
at Level 2, is phenomenal-placing an enormous strain on the resources of
domestic lawmakers and regulators. In addition, Member State lawmakers and
regulators might lack the "know how," experience, and sophistication required to
properly implement and apply the new legislation. This will create lacunae in the
application and enforcement of the new regime, contrary to the aspirations of the
Lamfalussy process. Moreover, despite the efforts of the EC securities Directives
to establish a comprehensive framework for cross-border regulatory supervision
and enforcement, the new regime will again suffer from regulatory fragmentation
(multiple regulators). Following FSAP implementation, EU financial markets
will present a very paradoxical view. These markets will be governed by
harmonized rules in the areas of prudential regulation, public offer, and
admission of securities to trading, market integrity, disclosure of information to
investors, and conduct of business. Yet relevant rules shall be enforced by at least
twenty-five different national authorities, probably much more, due to overlap of
regulatory responsibilities within national jurisdictions. As a result, supervisory
and enforcement decisions in what is, essentially, a single regime, will be
informed by the supervisory and enforcement cultures of at least twenty-five
different national regulators and by the conflicting agendas these may pursue.
From all of the FSAP implications discussed above, this is clearly the most
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important, and possibly the most threatening, to the successful application and
enforcement of the new legislation.
The reasonable and cost-effective solution to this problem can only be the
establishment of a central regulatory body for the supervision of EU securities
markets. This body, which cannot and should not be another Commission outpost
or the ECB, should be granted not only lawmaking, but also enforcement powers
which should be observed across the EU.2 30 Due to the restrictions posed by the
current EU legal framework, the establishment of such a body is not yet
possible."'
B. The Impact of New Legislation on the Structure of EU FinancialMarkets
With the implementation of FSAP related legislation, the institutional aspect
of the integration of EU financial markets is almost complete, notwithstanding
the lack of a single EU securities regulator. Yet actual market integration has not
been achieved.232 One of the factors inhibiting such integration is the unresolved
issue of integration and connectivity of clearing and settlement systems in the
233
EU.
Nonetheless, EC financial services legislation enacted under FSAP seems
poised to have a profound impact on the structure of EU financial markets and
the European financial services industry. The recent attempt by Deutsche Borse
and Euronext 234 to acquire Europe's oldest and most liquid market, the London
230. See FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 22, at 119-122.
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review of the state of market integration in the fields of market infrastructure, investment firms, primary
markets, and retail and wholesale markets for investment products).
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COM(2002)257 final (noting that the integration of clearing and settlement facilities in the EU and the
establishment of connectivity between them has been a matter of great concern for some time and is seen by the
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Stock Exchange, is a testament to the competitive pressures faced by regulated
markets in the EU and the increasing trends towards consolidation."'
The volume and detail of new legislation means that transaction costs in the
form of costs of compliance in EU markets may increase concentration within the
European investment services industry. The new regime is, on one hand, in some
cases, flexible and disclosure based, but in many others is overly legalistic and
bureaucratic. This is justified, to a certain extent, by the demands of an integrated
market, which in certain areas such as the rules of conduct, require maximum
harmonization. On the other hand, maximum harmonization means that lighter
national regulatory regimes will have to raise their standards in order to converge
with those of more developed and heavily regulated national ones, which
inevitably, in order to consent to the enactment of new legislation, have imported
in it the majority of their regulations. Higher regulatory standards translate into
increased expenditure on the part of domestic financial services firms.
Investment firms from European countries with less developed financial markets
face significantly increased costs in order to comply with the new regulatory
framework. Firms from countries with more developed financial markets will
also face increased compliance costs, although to a lesser extent, as they are
better prepared and more sophisticated in terms of regulatory compliance.
MiFID's demands on investment firm resources will be further exacerbated
236
following the implementation of the revised Capital Adequacy Directive, which
will introduce into the EU the new (and stricter) Basel capital adequacy
standards.
In light of the above, it is arguable that the new regime will threaten the
survival of all small and medium size investment firms in the EU; especially
those based in smaller countries. It will also encourage bringing together large
players through takeovers or mergers, in order to minimize compliance costs and
achieve economies of scale in the integrated market. Therefore, the combined
result of MiFID and of other FSAP related financial market legislation (such as
the new CAD and the Market Abuse Directive) may be less and not more
competition between providers of investment services in the EU, as the number
of currently operating investment firms, "regulated markets," and MTFs seems
bound to decrease. Reduced competition in an already oligopolistic market
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restricts, instead of enhancing, consumer choice; an outcome that could hardly be
found desirable by the architects of FSAP.
Furthermore, Article 40(5) of the FIMD could potentially prove to be a very
important catalyst for market integration. It gives the right to "regulated markets"
to admit to trading, without the consent of the issuer,237 of transferable securities
issued in another jurisdiction, provided that it has already been admitted to trading
in that jurisdiction. It facilitates, therefore, multiple admissions of securities, which
is arguably a strong integrative mechanism. Concurrently, it creates the potential
that large exchanges will use this facility to win business from regulated markets in
countries on the periphery of the EU, by admitting to trading the most popular
securities listed, and admitted to trading on those markets. This will, of course,
offer to professional and institutional investors the possibility of "one-stop shop,"
allowing them to concentrate on the same trading venue the entirety of their trading
volume in the most popular (liquid) European securities, economizing in
transaction costs. Thus, liquidity will be diverted from smaller markets to licensed
exchanges, MTFs, and "systematic internalizers" that operate in the more
developed EU markets. Such a result would diminish the role of smaller securities
exchanges as price formation mechanisms for highly sought "blue chip" securities,
which maintain a local listing. However, the price discovery function is the
principal reason (and possibly the only reason) smaller markets are able to attract
trading custom in their most popular securities. If this function is adversely
affected to a considerable degree, because liquidity is concentrated on foreign (and
more developed) regulated markets, the viability of the smaller EU securities
exchanges will be seriously threatened. Today, smaller markets face serious
liquidity threats as a result of trading opportunities engineered by, and based on,
modem technology. Therefore, the reduction in their number through
consolidation, whether the result of a conscious business decision or of the threat
posed by Article 40(5), may prove to be a positive development. Yet, because of
its seriousness, the pursuit of such a policy agenda should be an explicit and not
an implicit objective of EC securities legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION

The implementation of FSAP has been the main driver of reform of EC
financial market regulation since 1999. This article has provided a very analytical
discussion of the most central parts of the new EU regime for capital markets. This
legislation has been a very important step towards the integration of EU financial
markets. Yet many obstacles remain. These include discrepancies in the EU tax
regime for income from investments and private law rules (especially in the field of
contracts) governing investors' transactions on EU financial markets and
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discrepancies in corporate governance standards.238 In addition, the implementation
of FSAP has made apparent the existence of a deep hole at the heart of the EU
regulatory edifice, due to lack of a single regulator of EU securities markets.
Therefore, one of the most pressing issues that the implementation of FSAP
presents to European lawmakers is the challenge of finding a way to make possible
the establishment of such a functionary. It is also the most daunting one, due to the
opposition any such move is bound to face from the majority of the Member
States.
Furthermore, market integration is mostly a matter of market forces. Market
participants will embrace this task only if they identify cost savings and market
opportunities in adopting Pan-European business (trading) processes and
structures. Until the difficulties mentioned above are overcome the European single
securities market will remain "under construction. 239
Finally, the extensive volume of regulation that investment firms will have to
comply with, following the implementation of FSAP legislation into the legal
orders of the Member States, will trigger a colossal wave of consolidation within
the European financial services industry. The creation by FSAP legislation of selfstanding Pan-European regimes for the admission and trading of securities on
regulated markets and MTFs, frequently without a requirement to obtain the
consent of the issuer of the securities concerned, is predicted to lead smaller
European securities markets to loss of business and eventual merger with larger
exchanges, or even to extinction.
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